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CIVILIAN AND MILITARY WAR ORGANIZATIONS 
Army-Navy Munitions Board (ANMB): During WWII, the board was responsible for 
coordinating army and navy procurement of munitions and supplies, allocating machine 
tools, stockpiling critical materials, and purchasing military supplies from foreign 
suppliers. Established June 22, 1922. 
 
Quartermaster Corps: Military organization responsible for procuring, storing, and 
transporting supplies to U.S. soldiers. Established in 1775. 
 
National Defense Advisory Commission (NDAC): Consisted of committee members 
who oversaw industrial production, transportation, farm products, raw materials, 
employment, price stabilization, and consumer protection. Committee members advised 
the Council of National Defense on their respective areas of expertise as they related to 
national defense matters. Established in May 1940. 
 
Office of Defense Transportation (ODT): Created to coordinate and increase efficiency 
of all domestic transportation in the U.S., including railways, motors vehicles, pipelines, 
inland and coastal waterways, and air transport. Established by Executive Order on 
December 18, 1941. 
 
Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply (OPACS): Created to check 
inflation, profiteering, and skyrocketing prices by rationing scarce items, controlling 
prices in stores, issuing ration cards to civilians, and freezing rent prices. Established 
April 1941. Replaced by the Office of Price Administration (OPA) in August 1941. 
 
Office of Production Management (OPM): Coordinated the conversion of civilian 
industries to war production, regulated the production and supply of war materiél, and 
oversaw the federal procurement program. Established by Executive Order on January 7, 
1941. 
 
Office of War Mobilization (and Reconversion) (OWMR): Established by Executive 
Order on May 26, 1943. Originally named the Office of War Mobilization (OWM), 
OWM superseded the Office of Production Management. Oversaw all civilian war 
agencies and coordinated wartime economic planning. In October 1944, the agency 
assumed responsibility for postwar planning and was renamed the Office of War 
Mobilization and Reconversion. 
 
Ordnance Department: Military organization established in 1812 to oversee supply of 
weapons and ammunition to the U.S. military. 
 
Senate Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program (Truman 
Committee): A series of hearings held from 1941-1948 to investigate waste and 
corruption in national efforts to mobilize for war. The committee was nicknamed the 
Truman Committee after Harry S. Truman, the U.S. Senator and future President who 
chaired the committee from 1941-1944. 
v 
Smaller War Plants Corporation (SWPC): A division of the War Production Board 
created to help small businesses (fewer than 500 employees) obtain a larger share of war 
contracts and provide financial assistance to these businesses. Established June 1942. 
 
Supply Priorities and Allocation Board (SPAB): Coordinated military procurement 
needs with the production goals of the Office of Production Management. Activities 
included curtailing non-essential civilian production, expanding industry output, and 
allocating materials for war and civilian production. Established in August 1941. 
 
United States Employment Service (USES): Established as a federal organization in 
December 1941. Responsible for overseeing local employment services including labor 
registration, job placement programs, and gathering of employment statistics. Placed 
under the authority of the War Manpower Commission on September 17, 1942. 
 
War Industries Board (WIB): Central federal agency responsible for mobilizing the 
U.S. economy in the event of war. Oversaw conversion of industries to war production, 
regulated production output, allocated raw materials, and regulated prices. Established 
July 28, 1917. 
 
War Manpower Commission (WMC): Recruited labor for war industries and 
implemented plans to increase efficiency and maximum utilization of civilian manpower 
for war production. Established by Executive Order on April 18, 1942. 
 
War Production Board (WPB): Replaced the Supply Priorities Allocation Board and 
the Office of Production Management to serve as the umbrella agency that oversaw the 
entire war mobilization and federal procurement programs. Established by Executive 
Order on January 16, 1942. 
 
War Resources Board (WRB): Established August 1939. Advised the Army and Navy 
Munitions Board on matters of economic mobilization. Dissolved in November 1939. 
vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Civilian and Military War Organizations ..............................................................................iv 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................1 
Chapter 1: Historiography of U.S. Industrial Mobilization Literature ..................................6 
Chapter 2: Real Silk Hosiery Mills Company History, 1921-1941 .......................................32 
Chapter 3: Material Shortages and Government Regulations ................................................46 
Chapter 4: Labor Problems ....................................................................................................78 
Chapter 5: Conclusion............................................................................................................112 
Bibliography ..........................................................................................................................119 
Curriculum Vitae 
1 
Introduction 
As war raged across Europe in 1941, General Motors president Alfred Sloan aptly 
described the Second World War as “nothing more or less than a conflict between 
opposing technocracies.”1 In this war, the outcome depended as much upon a nation’s 
resources and industrial capacity as it did upon the size of its armed forces. President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt laid out the important role the United States played in outfitting 
the Allied Forces for war in his 1942 State of the Union Address. In this speech he 
admonished critics of his industrial mobilization plan, citing 1941 U.S. production figures 
for combat vehicles, guns, and munitions as evidence that the “arsenal of democracy is 
making good.”2 Later in this speech, Roosevelt referred to U.S. output as a “miracle of 
production” since U.S. manufacture of war materials dramatically increased at the same 
time that large numbers of young men were being drawn from the workforce to fight 
abroad.3 This pivotal speech planted the seeds of a national mythology about the 
American war effort in the Second World War. In the arena of war production, the United 
States undeniably excelled and out-produced its major allies in nearly every munitions 
category. This unprecedented feat ingrained the terms “Arsenal of Democracy” and 
“production miracle” in American popular memory and the terms appear in many books 
and articles written on the nation’s industrial mobilization efforts.4
                                                          
1 Quoted in David Farber, Sloan Rules: Alfred P. Sloan and the Triumph of General Motors 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 227. 
 
2 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, “State of the Union Address,” January 6, 1942, The American 
Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=16253 (accessed 28 October 2012). 
3 Roosevelt, “State of the Union Address,” January 6, 1942. 
4 See Paul A.C. Koistinen, “Warfare and Power Relations in America: Mobilizing the World War 
II Economy,” in The Home Front and War in the Twentieth Century: The American Experience in 
Comparative Perspective: Proceedings of the Tenth Military History Symposium, 20-22 October 1982, ed. 
James Titus (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984). 
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This rosy view of U.S. industrial mobilization efforts persists because many 
historical sources about World War II on the American home front focus on the 
production output of large businesses and high priority industries during the war. Yet, the 
glamour assigned to war production, such as the image of Rosie the Riveter and the 
thousands of airplanes rolling off the Ford production lines, often precludes discussion of 
the immense challenges and complexity of the industrial mobilization program. 
Businesses had to overcome a plethora of obstacles to fill the great “arsenal.” 
Additionally, while large corporations producing high-priority war materials prospered 
during the war, smaller businesses and those in low-priority industries did not necessarily 
achieve the same resounding success. 
Home to many factories and companies, Indianapolis, Indiana, played a crucial 
role in the war effort, ranking among the top ten in the nation in terms of war material 
production.5 Among the approximately 421 businesses that produced war materials in the 
city, Allison Engineering, Curtiss-Wright, and Navistar represented some of the large, 
high-priority industries within the city, while the Real Silk Hosiery Mills is representative 
of the small and mid-sized companies that produced lower priority goods.6
                                                          
5 David J. Bodenhamer and Robert G. Barrows, eds., Encyclopedia of Indianapolis, s.v “World 
War II,” (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), 1464. 
 Real Silk was 
a mid-size business in the lower-priority textile industry that produced parachutes, 
mosquito netting, and other military necessities during the war. Due to the important role 
of Indianapolis in the war production effort, coupled with the wide variety of industries 
located there during the war, the city’s businesses are excellent subjects for study as they 
mirror the successes and challenges experienced by businesses nationwide during WWII 
industrial mobilization. Although detailed records from individual companies during the 
6 Bodenhamer and Barrows, Encyclopedia of Indianapolis, 1410. 
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war years can be difficult to locate or access, extensive records from the Real Silk 
Hosiery Mills are extant and provide insight into how the WWII mobilization program 
affected businesses at a local level. 
The decade leading up to WWII was a tumultuous one for Real Silk. The Great 
Depression contracted the market for the luxury items produced by the company, forcing 
Real Silk to the brink of bankruptcy in 1932.  However, under new leadership the 
company slowly and steadily recovered, posting modest profits for the rest of the decade. 
By 1940, Real Silk felt the impact of the war that was raging abroad. The silk market 
destabilized and a dramatic rise in raw silk prices caused Real Silk to post a loss that 
year. Yet the company continued to adapt successfully to the changing conditions. 
Introducing a line of nylon stockings in the second half of 1940, the company mitigated 
its overall losses for 1940 and returned to profitability in 1941. 
As the United States entered WWII, Real Silk faced a new set of challenges. 
Businesses nationwide struggled to meet the demands of the wartime economy. They had 
to adapt to a nebulous and ever-changing set of rules and increasing government 
regulation. Scarcities of materials, an overburdened transportation system, and labor 
shortages presented obstacles to efficiency at many factories. When Real Silk was forced 
to convert to war production, profits dropped precipitously in 1942. The company not 
only incurred great expense adapting its facilities to manufacture war materiél, but it also 
dealt with a plethora of labor problems such as training an inexperienced workforce and 
high absentee and turnover rates among women workers as they struggled with their 
newly defined roles in the wartime economy. 
4 
Although the Second World War undoubtedly reshaped the American economy, 
the economic boost often associated with the war did not occur across the board. While 
the war increased output, expanded production capacity, and led to post-war economic 
prosperity for some businesses and industries, it stifled other companies or forced them 
out of business. Through a case study of the Real Silk Hosiery Mills of Indianapolis, 
Indiana, I will examine a number of factors that impacted businesses’ efficiency and 
profitability during the war. In 1943, the War Production Board (WPB), a civilian agency 
in charge of coordinating the national mobilization program, identified four major 
bottlenecks that inhibited the industrial war machine: critical raw materials, food 
products, transportation, and labor supply.7
Chapter 1 includes a historiography of the secondary literature on U.S. industrial 
mobilization during World War II and situates this case study within the broader 
literature. This chapter provides the framework for evaluating Real Silk’s war time 
experiences with the mobilization program. Based upon the records of the Real Silk 
Hosiery Mills, Chapter 2 provides a brief history of the company. The company’s 
financial position in the years leading up to WWII is explored. The chapter also discusses 
 Real Silk encountered many problems with 
material supply, transportation delays, and labor shortages, often caused or exacerbated 
by government regulations during the war. A case study of Real Silk’s war experiences 
provides a detailed portrait of the new obstacles the war presented that impeded effective 
business operations. 
                                                          
7 Civilian Production Administration, Bureau of Demobilization, Meeting 69: January 22, 1943, 
“Comparative Study of War-Time Trends,” Minutes of the Planning Committee of the War Production 
Board, February 20, 1942 to April 1, 1943, Historical Reports on War Administration: War Production 
Board Documentary Publication No. 5 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), 112 
(hereafter cited as WPBPC.) 
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Real Silk’s conversion to war production and the immediate effects the conversion had 
on the profitability of the company.  
Chapter 3 examines how wartime government regulations and the unique 
circumstances of the war impeded normal, efficient operations at Real Silk. Obstacles 
faced by the company such as material shortages, transportation congestion, and 
bureaucratic red tape imposed by wartime government agencies are discussed. The 
evidence for this chapter was gleaned from meeting minutes of the central mobilization 
agencies during the war including the Office of Production Management, Supply 
Priorities and Allocation Board, and the War Production Board, as well as Real Silk’s 
company records and annual reports. 
The labor problems that were introduced by the war are the focus of Chapter 4. 
The discussion includes the impact of labor shortages, absenteeism, high turnover, and 
labor disputes on Real Silk’s production capacity and potential for expansion. Statistics 
from the Employment Security Division’s studies of the Indiana Labor Market Area 
1941-1946, the Indiana War History Commission’s report on the company, and Real 
Silk’s company records are some of the sources utilized in this chapter. 
Chapter 5 contains a summary of the findings presented in the previous chapters 
and discusses their significance. Broadly, this thesis will contribute to WWII home front 
literature as well as the literature on the WWII industrial mobilization program. It 
examines the problems faced by a small to mid-sized company in a low priority industry 
during the war and challenges the popularly-held belief that WWII pulled businesses out 
of the Great Depression and that the expansion of businesses during the war led to 
extended post-war prosperity. 
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Chapter 1 
Historiography of U.S. Industrial Mobilization Literature 
The literature on U.S. WWII industrial mobilization can be broken into three 
categories based upon the methodology employed to either support or challenge the 
traditional perception of U.S. wartime production as the miraculous “Arsenal of 
Democracy.”8
The earliest, and most prolific, studies of industrial mobilization focused on 
government and military war administration, as well as the civilian agencies that emerged 
during WWII to address mobilization issues. Shortly after the war’s end, former 
employees of the wartime government agencies and the War Department wrote histories 
and critical studies of the agencies for which they worked, beginning in 1947 with the 
 The first sources on the subject emerged in the late 1940s through the 
1950s and included administrative histories and studies of the war mobilization agencies 
written by former employees of these agencies. After 1960, historians began studying 
distinct aspects of the industrial mobilization program, such as President Franklin 
Roosevelt’s mobilization plans and the role of corporate liberals in civilian war agencies. 
Historians evaluated these aspects from different perspectives such as economics, labor 
studies, and the political economy of warfare, which focused on business-government-
military relations. A third, though less common, method historians have applied to the 
problem is case studies of state, local, or individual industries. Together, this literature 
illustrates the impact of the war mobilization program on local American businesses and 
workers who kept the wheels of the U.S. war machine in motion. 
                                                          
8 During a December 1940 radio broadcast, President Roosevelt coined the slogan “Arsenal of 
Democracy,” referring to the U.S. promise to provide supplies and weapons to the Allies before the U.S.’s 
entry into the war. In this view, patriotic Americans willingly united to mobilize industry and the economy 
for war. In James Burns, Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
1970), 27-29. 
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Civilian Production Administration’s Industrial Mobilization for War: History of the War 
Production Board and Predecessor Agencies, 1940-1945, Program and Administration. 
Additional studies were released through the 1950s. These early publications evaluated 
the successes and failures of the mobilization agencies in order to make recommendations 
for future war mobilization efforts should the need arise. The main agencies under 
scrutiny in these publications included the War Resources Board (WRB), the National 
Defense Advisory Commission (NDAC), the Office of Production Management (OPM), 
the War Production Board (WPB), and the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion 
(OWMR). These administrative histories and assessments emerged so close to the actual 
events examined that they walk the line between primary and secondary sources. 
However, the authors provided critical assessments of an historical event utilizing 
primary sources as evidence. Also, these sources are so widely cited in the subsequent 
literature on U.S. WWII mobilization that their influence cannot be overlooked in a 
historiography of the subject. Such early works include Herman Miles Somers’s 
Presidential Agency: The Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion (1950), Eliot 
Janeway’s The Struggle for Survival: A Chronicle of Economic Mobilization in World 
War II (1951), and Elberton Smith’s The Army and Economic Mobilization (1959).9
                                                          
9 Herman Miles Somers served as a senior economist on the National Resource Planning Board 
before the war and worked for the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion in 1946. Eliot Janeway 
was a prominent American economist and economic advisor to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Elberton 
Smith worked as an economist for the War Production Board during the war. U.S. Civilian Production 
Administration, Industrial Mobilization for War, History of the War Production Board and Predecessor 
Agencies, 1940-1945. V. 1. Program and Administration, Historical Reports on War Administration 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947); Herman Miles Somers, Presidential Agency: 
The Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950); Eliot 
Janeway, The Struggle for Survival: A Chronicle of Economic Mobilization in World War II (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1951); Elberton R. Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization (Washington, D.C.: 
Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1959). 
 
8 
While the majority of the 1940-50s literature offered complimentary, even 
glowing assessments of U.S. mobilization, two of the most significant early works on 
mobilization included constructive criticism of the civilian production agencies: Melvin 
Anshen, David Novick, and W.C. Truppner’s Wartime Production Controls (1949) and 
Robert H. Connery’s The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in World War II (1951).10 
In Wartime Production Controls (1949), the three authors, who were former employees 
of the WPB, focused on the administrative machinery of the agencies and critically 
appraised “the techniques of production control devised and administered by the War 
Production Board and its predecessor agencies….”11 They argued that the U.S.’s WWII 
industrial mobilization program replicated many of the mistakes made by the War 
Industries Board in WWI because the WPB’s predecessor agencies set policies before 
developing the proper administrative infrastructure to carry them forward.12
Providing an assessment of industrial mobilization from the War Department’s 
perspective, Robert Connery wrote The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in World 
War II at the request of Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal. Connery, a professor 
emeritus of political science at Duke University and a former commissioned officer in the 
Bureau of Naval Personnel during WWII, explored the complex relationship between the 
Navy, Army, and the war production and procurement agencies. He argued that the 
 Anshen, 
Novick, and Truppner asserted that U.S. success during WWII resulted from the nation’s 
great economic wealth rather than the effectiveness of its mobilization program. 
                                                          
10 Melvin Anshen, David Novick, and W.C. Truppner, Wartime Production Controls (New York, 
NY: Columbia University Press, 1949); Robert H. Connery, The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in 
World War II (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1951). 
11 Anshen, Novick, and Truppner, Wartime Production Controls, v. 
12 The War Production Board’s predecessor agencies were the National Defense Advisory 
Commission, the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board, and the Office of Production Management. 
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achievements of the Navy were impressive in light of the nation’s general unpreparedness 
for war. However, he criticized the lack of adequate infrastructure for materials 
procurement until the war’s tail end in 1944-5 and the general disconnect between the 
Navy’s military plans and its procurement plans. Connery recommended that in the 
future, the Navy make a greater effort to organize the necessary procurement and 
production agencies during the period of national emergency that often precedes a formal 
declaration of war.13
Building upon these early histories and studies of the war mobilization agencies, 
historians began assessing the success of industrial mobilization through other lenses. 
The political economy of warfare is perhaps the most popular lens through which 
historians have examined the problem. Historian Paul A.C. Koistinen defined the political 
economy of warfare as “the interrelations of political, economic, and military institutions 
in devising the means to mobilize resources for defense and to conduct war.”
 
14
One of the most prolific writers on industrial and economic mobilization in 
American wars, Koistinen has been publishing on the political economy of warfare since 
1965 when he published his dissertation, The Hammer and the Sword: Labor, the 
Military, and Industrial Mobilization, 1920-1945. In addition to multiple articles, 
 Several 
authors have examined industrial mobilization from this perspective—through the 
interrelation of power structures, especially military, industrial, economic, and political. 
Many of these sources address the origins of the military-industrial complex in World 
War II and add to the body of literature on the power struggles between big business and 
the government during the war. 
                                                          
13 Connery, The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization, ix, 4-5, 438-441, 443. 
14 Paul A. C. Koistinen, Arsenal of World War II: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 
1940-1945 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 2. 
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Koistinen has published a five-volume series that traces the political economy of 
American warfare from the American Revolution through 2011. His publications on 
WWII mobilization have served as a springboard and point of contention for many 
historians who have published on the subject.15
The contentious nature of Koistinen’s arguments is particularly evident in the 
published proceedings of the Tenth Military History Symposium (1982) on “The Home 
Front and War in the Twentieth Century” sponsored by the United States Air Force 
Academy. Koistinen presented a paper titled “Warfare and Power Relations in America: 
Mobilizing the World War II Economy.” In this paper, Koistinen argued against what he 
referred to as the “necessitarian” view of WWII mobilization—“a form of determinism” 
that he asserted many historians of general U.S. WWII literature at the time relied upon 
to explain the success of economic mobilization.
 
16
                                                          
15 Koistinen’s books include The Hammer and the Sword (New York: Arno Press, 1965); The 
Military-Industrial Complex: A Historical Perspective (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980); Beating 
Ploughshares into Swords: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1606-1865 (Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 1996); Mobilizing for Modern War: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1865-
1919 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1997); Planning War, Pursuing Peace: The Political 
Economy of American Warfare, 1920-1939 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998); Arsenal of 
World War II: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1940-1945 (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 2004); State of War: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1945-2011 (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2012). 
 In his notes, Koistinen traced this 
necessitarian view through many sources on the WWII home front, including such 
influential works as John Morton Blum’s V Was For Victory: Politics and American 
Culture During World War II (1976), Alan Clive’s State of War: Michigan in World War 
II (1979), and Richard Polenberg’s War and Society: The United States, 1941-1945 
16 Paul A.C. Koistinen, “Warfare and Power Relations in America: Mobilizing the World War II 
Economy,” in The Home Front and War in the Twentieth Century: The American Experience in 
Comparative Perspective: Proceedings of the Tenth Military History Symposium, October 20-22, 1982, ed. 
James Titus (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), 91. 
11 
(1972).17 The necessitarian viewpoint argued that American citizens worked together 
willingly to achieve war goals out of the necessity for victory. Koistinen pointed out that 
the necessitarian thesis focused on the positive end-products of the war. However, when 
the means for carrying out war objectives are considered, Koistinen asserted that the 
necessitarian view crumbles. Certainly, Americans agreed that victory must be achieved, 
but they were divided in their opinions of how this victory could be accomplished.18
He also countered the “miracle of production” thesis that U.S. mobilization was 
exceptional by arguing that in comparison to other belligerents, U.S. production output 
was not as impressive as originally perceived.
 
19 Koistinen asserted that “to approach the 
World War II record from such a narrow perspective not only limits our understanding of 
the event greatly, but also strengthens the concept of American Exceptionalism—a mode 
of thought that encourages parochialism on the part of both the general public and the 
scholar.”20 He pointed out that the NDAC and OPM were ineffective in converting 
industry to war production and that most military procurement was accomplished through 
“normal civilian production” and newly-built factories.21 He concluded that “the clumsy 
mobilization structure got the job done, but only adequately, not exceptionally, so.”22
                                                          
17 John Morton Blum, V Was For Victory: Politics and American Culture During World War II 
(New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1976); Alan Clive, State of War: Michigan in World War II (Ann 
Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1979); Richard Polenberg, War and Society: The United States, 
1941-1945 (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1972). 
 
According to Koistinen, much of the blame rested with Franklin Roosevelt, whom he 
18 Koistinen, “Warfare and Power Relations in America,” 91, fn 1. 
19 Ibid., 101, fn 9. 
20 Ibid., 101. 
21 Ibid., 93. 
22 Ibid., 92. 
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alleged failed to challenge traditional military and industrial power structures to 
overcome barriers to war production.23
The designated commentator for Koistinen’s session at the military symposium, 
historian Robert D. Cuff, challenged many of the ideas Koistinen set forth in his paper, 
and later, in his 2004 volume on the political economy of American warfare in WWII. 
First, Cuff countered Koistinen’s criticism of the internal strife within the government 
mobilization agencies by arguing that other countries experienced the same problems in 
their mobilization efforts. He pointed out that American war production was all the more 
impressive in light of the chaotic environment in which the government agencies 
operated. He then defended Roosevelt’s wartime polices by placing them in political 
context, arguing that the president refused to challenge traditional power structures 
during the war in order to preserve national unity in the war effort and to prevent 
alienation of his party’s political support base. Finally, Cuff tempered Koistinen’s 
criticism of the corporate-government partnership by asserting that industrial 
mobilization efforts could not have succeeded without such a partnership, as industrialists 
contributed the technical knowledge to make the program work, while the government 
possessed the authority to implement the recommendations of these experts.
 
24
In 1991, Gregory Hooks, a professor of sociology at the University of Wisconsin, 
applied sociological theory to the study of the military-industrial complex and business-
government-military relations in Forging the Military-Industrial Complex: World War 
II’s Battle of the Potomac. Hooks used a “state-centered” approach which asserted that 
 
                                                          
23 Ibid., 103-108. 
24 Robert D. Cuff, “Commentary,” in The Home Front and War in the Twentieth Century: The 
American Experience in Comparative Perspective: Proceedings of the Tenth Military History Symposium, 
20-22 October 1982, ed. James Titus (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), 111-
118. 
13 
the government intervened in the economy via economic controls to achieve objectives 
determined by the state rather than by national interest groups. Hooks’s three most 
important hypotheses were: 1) The federal government influenced the direction of the 
economic mobilization program through its investments of capital and distribution of war 
contracts; 2) Big-business gained greater autonomy from the federal government that it 
retained after the war; and 3) The military-industrial complex developed during WWII.25
Like Koistinen, Hooks argued that the foundation of the military-industrial 
complex was built during World War II mobilization. However, Hook’s assertions 
contrast those of Koistinen because he further argued that the military and federal 
government rather than big-business exercised the most power during the war. Hook 
demonstrated that while private businesses were an essential component of the military-
industrial complex, “they were ultimately client firms of the state and dependent upon 
it.”
 
26 The author reached several conclusions that contributed a new perspective on the 
study of U.S. war mobilization. Despite the claims of the 1940-50s sources that the 
civilian agencies directed the U.S. war production, Hooks concluded that the successful 
supply of munitions to American soldiers and the allies occurred “despite this chaotic 
administration—not because of it….”27
                                                          
25 Gregory Hooks, Forging the Military-Industrial Complex: World War II’s Battle of the Potomac 
(Urbana and Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1991), 5-7. 
 Government regulations and programs failed to 
effectively mobilize war production. Instead, it was the government’s direction of 
industrial mobilization through financial investments in military production that 
ultimately built the “arsenal of democracy.” This extra capital was extracted from the 
nation through new taxes, war bonds, and other measures and then reinvested in military 
26 Hooks, Forging the Military-Industrial Complex, 5. 
27 Ibid., 125. 
14 
production. Such heightened military spending helped elevate the Pentagon to the 
powerful position it held in the military-industrial complex of the Cold War.28
In a 1996 monograph titled Mobilizing U.S. Industry in World War II: Myth and 
Reality, Alan L. Gropman agreed with Koistinen that the “miracle” of WWII industrial 
mobilization and production was not any more impressive than that of its allies and 
enemies, considering that U.S. industries endured no losses from bombing or threat of 
invasion. Referring directly to Koistinen’s paper from the Military Symposium, Gropman 
concurred that partisan politics inhibited war production efficiency. He further argued 
that the government underestimated the needs of its allies in its material plans and that 
the military could have increased production efficiency if it had handed over control of 
the wartime economy to civilians earlier in the war.
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Keith Eiler, a United States military historian and retired lieutenant colonel in the 
U.S. Army, employed a different approach to examining the power structures involved in 
WWII mobilization through a biography of Robert P. Patterson titled Mobilizing 
America: Robert P. Patterson and the War Effort, 1940-1945 (1997). Through this 
biography of the former U.S. Under Secretary of War, Eiler provided insight into the 
people at the top of the U.S. power structures who clambered for influence during the 
war. Eiler focused on Patterson’s clashes with war mobilization heads such as Paul V. 
McNutt of the War Manpower Commission and Donald Nelson of the WPB. According 
to Eiler, war production officials fell into two camps based upon their approach to 
mobilization: officials like Patterson, who called for an all-out effort to bring the war to a 
swift end at any cost and officials who strove to avoid “needless” disruption of the 
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American home front life to win the war.30 Based on the clashes between these two 
camps recounted in Patterson’s personal papers, Eiler concluded that the U.S. 
mobilization program was poorly managed. He asserted that the “haphazardness of the 
Roosevelt administration” in its dealings with mobilization allowed the “business as 
usual” attitude of big-business to inhibit all-out mobilization. Eiler also pointed to 
manpower mobilization problems and public apathy as severe limits on war production 
capacity during WWII.31
In 2004, Koistinen published the fourth volume in his five-part series on the 
political economy of warfare titled Arsenal of World War II: The Political Economy of 
American Warfare, 1940-1945. In this volume, he built upon many of the points he made 
in his presentation at the 1982 Military History Symposium. Koistinen’s main argument 
was that economic mobilization during WWII required an unprecedented level of 
partnership between military and industrial elites that allowed corporate leaders to regain 
much of the control over the American economy that they had lost during the Great 
Depression. He set the stage for this argument within his four-factor paradigm, asserting 
that big-business leaders eroded New Deal reforms (political) to regain power in the 
expanding wartime economy by building an alliance with the military, which depended 
upon industry to produce the rapidly advancing technology of warfare.
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 In a semi-
chronological history of numerous civilian and military mobilization agencies, he traced 
the growing alliance between corporate and military elites from the pre-war NDAC 
through reconversion to a peace-time economy under the OWMR, emphasizing how 
31 Ibid., 467. 
32 Koistinen, Arsenal of World War II, 2, 9, 515-516. 
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industry leaders, with the support of the military, dominated the agencies and shaped 
their policies to benefit big-business interests.33 However, Koistinen’s most noteworthy 
contributions to the industrial mobilization scholarship appeared in his conclusion. 
Confronting the notion of the U.S. “miracle of production” set forth in Eliot Janeway’s 
early work, Koistinen asserted that the American production record was not exceptional 
when compared to its war-torn European counterparts.34 According to Koistinen, the U.S. 
had not reached its full productive capacity by the cessation of hostilities because 
industry held back mobilization to continue to exploit expanding civilian markets and 
prevent excess capacity in the tenuous circumstances of war. He also attributed the 
unfulfilled American industrial capacity to military leaders who failed to produce 
“reliable requirement figures” due to their mistaken belief that the economy was a 
“bottomless well” of productive capacity and their blind acceptance of industry’s self-
interested production plans.35
Two more recent works, Richard E. Holl’s From the Boardroom to the War 
Room: America's Corporate Liberals and FDR's Preparedness Program (2005) and 
Michael G. Carew’s Becoming the Arsenal: The American Industrial Mobilization for 
World War II, 1938-1942 (2010), presented a more positive perspective on the industrial 
mobilization program and government-business-military relations during the war. 
Richard Holl’s monograph examined the influence of corporate liberals on the policies of 
the industrial mobilization agencies and the general shape of the mobilization program. 
Corporate liberals insisted upon industry control of the economy, yet also supported 
cooperation between government and business, with government playing a subordinate, 
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supportive role. They also supported welfare capitalist36 initiatives.37 Holl departed 
notably from previous scholarship on industrial mobilization in several ways. First, he 
praised the efforts of big-business representatives such as William Knudsen, Donald 
Nelson, and Edward Stettinius on the civilian mobilization boards. He painted corporate 
liberals as mobilization leaders caught between the agendas of all-outers like Patterson 
who pushed the WRB and NDAC to speed up mobilization and isolationists who 
criticized the early mobilization planning committees as warmongers. In light of these 
conflicting pressures, Holl considered corporate liberal achievements in war mobilization 
to be impressive.38
While Holl praised corporate liberals’ wartime achievements, he openly 
acknowledged that these businessmen sought to use the circumstances of the war to their 
advantage to preserve autonomy from government control. Holl also conceded that profit-
making and the protection of “oligopolistic stability” served as huge motivators for 
corporate liberals to support the war effort. However, he argued that these self-interested 
motives were not in conflict with wartime national security goals. Instead, he asserted 
that corporate liberals were largely responsible for U.S. mobilization success and that 
“government-business cooperation” was the only suitable method for producing the 
powerhouse arsenal of democracy from America’s languishing businesses.
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unprepared U.S. industries into the high-yield production necessary to support the 
country in wartime. Corporate liberal gains for big business, such as amortization 
deductions, repeal of the severe profit-limits on airplane and ship manufacturers under 
the Vinson-Trammell Act, and the institution of manageable excess profits taxes sped up 
mobilization considerably.40 In addition, unlike Gropman and Koistinen, Holl did not 
criticize the constant morphing of the industrial mobilization agencies, but argued that 
each organization served as a building block in the foundation of America’s industrial 
war machine. He pointed out that while President Roosevelt initially rejected the original 
corporate liberal plan for integration of military and industry under a central War 
Resources Administration (WRA), each civilian mobilization agency from NDAC to the 
WPB became increasingly similar to the WRA. In fact, the WPB, which has traditionally 
been considered the most successful of the mobilization agencies, functioned in nearly 
the same manner as the WRA, which never materialized.41
In Becoming the Arsenal, Michael Carew, a professor of economics and finance at 
Baruch College, CUNY, took a more moderate approach in his counterargument to the 
harsh critics of the mobilization program. In a unique inter-disciplinary study of U.S. 
industrial mobilization, Carew drew upon scholarship from the fields of economics, 
politics, management, and history in this examination of what he considered one of the 
three most important events in twentieth-century American economic history. In addition 
to the Great Depression and “the New Deal abandonment of the gold standard,” Carew 
considered U.S. industrial mobilization for the Second World War a crucial economic 
event because it “had permanent and fundamental consequences for the American 
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political economy.”42
He used contextual background to stress the complex challenges of mobilization 
and to underscore how impressive the arsenal of democracy was in light of these 
complexities. Carew also illuminated the powers allotted to the president in wartime to 
emphasize how much direct influence Roosevelt had over the successful U.S. 
mobilization program. The thesis Carew built throughout the book is that “Roosevelt’s 
rare set of skills proved vital in the process of defining and achieving the requisite 
economic mobilization” for World War II.
 Yet what really set Carew’s book apart from similar works was his 
focus on President Franklin Roosevelt as the champion of WWII mobilization. 
43 For example, due to his previous experience 
in the Navy, Roosevelt understood the amount of lead time necessary to build modern 
naval ships. This knowledge of the Navy prompted him to mobilize shipyards early in his 
plans. Roosevelt also maintained direct control of the mobilization program rather than 
delegating power and, through his political mastery, he built the consensus among 
Congress and the American people necessary to support the war effort. Carew ultimately 
concluded that only through Roosevelt’s strong commitment to mobilizing the American 
economy was the great arsenal built.44
However, Carew’s most valuable contribution to the scholarship appeared in 
another of his conclusions. He engaged in the debate as to whether or not American 
wartime production output was as monumental as originally perceived. Carew argued 
against the “fallacy of projecting our current values on a prior period” and advocated 
measuring Gross National Product (GNP) according to the “technological appreciations” 
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and “managerial processes” of the time.45 Using one of the most convincing economic 
models in the mobilization literature, Carew quantified the value of production output 
using measures of the time period. His analysis revealed that the average annual growth 
rate for GNP between 1940-5 was 30 percent, which he considered monumental for a 
five-year period.46 Both Carew’s arguments concerning Roosevelt and the measure of 
production output directly countered the thesis of Paul Koistinen, whom he boldly 
dismissed as a “military conspiracy theorist.”47
Another common lens through which U.S. WWII mobilization has been examined 
is economics. Many economists and economic historians have placed industrial 
mobilization within the greater context of WWII economic mobilization and military 
logistics and used economic models to illustrate the accomplishments or failed potential 
of the U.S. mobilization program. Hugh Rockoff, an economist who was widely 
published and cited in the Journal of Economic History, published two significant articles 
that challenged conclusions other historians reached concerning aspects of the U.S. 
mobilization program. 
 
The first article, “The Paradox of Planning in World War II” (1996), confronted 
the paradoxical problem that economists faced in explaining evidence that the WPB’s 
Controlled Materials Plan (CMP) solved the problem of allocating resources to their most 
productive uses in support of the war effort. As Rockoff explained, mainstream 
economists believed that markets will usually be more successful than central planners in 
allocating resources where needed. Rockoff outlined the explanations that economists 
have proffered for this economic anomaly of WWII planning, including the argument that 
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civilian patriotism made central planning workable, military necessity and not the market 
determined production goals, and markets could not respond fast enough to demands for 
military production in the uncertain conditions of wartime. While Rockoff acknowledged 
that all these explanations have merit, he argued that market competition was, in fact, 
largely responsible for successful allocation of materials and increased production. 
Rockoff used munitions production statistics to prove that the major production output 
increases during the war occurred before the CMP took effect. Instead, he asserted that 
pecuniary incentives played the greatest role in stimulating production output. As private 
businesses sought war contracts to reap profits, market competition for these contracts 
largely encouraged a shift of production and resources from the civilian to the military 
sector. Throughout the article, Rockoff provided convincing evidence that management 
of the economy by government agencies like the WPB was not as directly responsible for 
the success of industrial mobilization as ascribed in earlier sources in the literature.48
In Rockoff’s second article on U.S. war production, “From Plowshares to Swords: 
The American Economy in World War II” (1998), the economist argued that 
mobilization of the U.S. economy should be viewed as “an unfolding historical process” 
rather than “a single, undifferentiated event.”
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explored multiple factors that contributed to the monumental increases in industrial 
production during the war. He asserted that no individual factor explained the escalated 
output. Rather, Rockoff gave credit to increases in the stock of capital, the total factor 
productivity, labor force participation rates, average hours per work week, and 
curtailment of civilian goods production in addition to other factors.50 In the first section 
of his essay, Rockoff addressed problems with various models used to calculate 
production growth and output during WWII. He pointed out distortions in the 
calculations of U.S. war production output rates because the years used as a basis for 
comparison were often too far out from the actual event. He proposed using a base year 
close to the war period “so that we see the war from the perspective of the generation that 
experienced it.”51 Additionally, Rockoff argued against the Keynesian perspective that 
government investment in the Lend-Lease program increased U.S. GNP. Rather, he 
pointed out that while unemployment was still high during the lend-lease period, the 
economy was already expanding before government controls came into effect.52 Rockoff 
also set his argument apart from those of other economists by employing a model called 
the “U.S. production possibilities curve.” This model revealed the considerable extent to 
which curtailment of civilian production allowed for increased military production 
capacity. The model supported Rockoff’s argument by illustrating that rather than having 
abundant resources, the U.S. had to pull resources from one sector to accommodate 
another.53
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In his article, “The Impact of the Second World War on U.S. Productivity 
Growth” (2008), economic historian Alexander J. Field agreed with Rockoff that 
although conversion for war production reached its height in 1942, it did not reach this 
goal through the utilization of unemployed resources. Field specifically refuted the 
common argument that WWII industrial production from mobilization through 
demobilization (1941-1948) pulled the United States out of the Great Depression and 
paved the way for economic prosperity after the war. He argued that productivity data for 
the private non-farm economy demonstrated a slower total factor productivity54 growth 
between 1941 and 1948 than before or after the war.55 While Field acknowledged that the 
war initially delivered positive supply shocks, or sudden increases in supply of goods, he 
asserted that these were countered by negative economic disruptions from “rapid 
mobilization and demobilization.”56
A recent monograph published on U.S. industrial and economic mobilization also 
examined war production from an economic perspective. In Keep from All Thoughtful 
Men: How U.S. Economists Won World War II (2011), Jim Lacey placed industrial 
mobilization within the context of military logistics and illuminated the role of key U.S. 
economists in the Great Feasibility Debate. This “debate” centered on the problem of 
 So much time, energy, and resources were diverted 
into retooling factories, developing new products, and retraining employees in both 
mobilization and demobilization that overall productivity growth during the Second 
World War was limited. 
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balancing U.S. industrial capacity with the military’s expectations for materials and 
supplies to support its campaigns. Lacey contended that military and economic historians 
have, for the most part, failed to explore “the economic decisions that drive war 
production or to relate them to the critical military choices of the war” in their studies.57
First, he disputed the myth that Lieutenant General Albert Wedemeyer’s “Victory 
Program Report” became the foundation of the U.S. military logistical and procurement 
strategy. Second, Lacey refuted the common belief that British intransigence at the 
Casablanca Conference forced General George C. Marshall to postpone the Normandy 
invasion. In fact, Lacey proved that Marshall was aware of the impracticality of an 
invasion in 1943 based on munitions production statistics before he arrived at the 
conference. Third, Lacey challenged glowing reports of President Roosevelt’s successful 
guidance of the mobilization program from historians like Cuff and Carew. He illustrated 
how the president’s unrealistic production goals, inflexibility, and insistence on 
producing self-determined priority items nearly brought war production to a standstill. 
Finally, Lacey argued against the myth that Americans patriotically sacrificed consumer 
goods so that civilian industries could be fully converted to munitions production. He 
further explained how economists like Simon Kuznets of the WPB determined that the 
military’s original demands for supplies were unrealistic. Kuznets presented the War 
Department with a feasibility study that demonstrated the impracticality of military 
production goals and called for reductions in these demands. Lacey concluded that 
 
Lacey reinterpreted the strategic history of the Second World War to challenge four 
myths that emerged in the extant literature on mobilization. 
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economists’ feasibility reports had a direct influence on the length and outcome of the 
war, as well as the ultimate success of industrial mobilization efforts.58
Several historians also examined industrial mobilization through the lens of labor 
history including George Q. Flynn’s The Mess in Washington: Manpower Mobilization in 
World War II and James B. Atleson’s Labor and the Wartime State: Labor Relations and 
Law During World War II. In The Mess in Washington: Manpower Mobilization in World 
War II (1979), Flynn provided a more positive assessment of the mobilization structure in 
his analysis of the War Manpower Commission (WMC) and its director, Paul McNutt. 
Flynn concluded that the absence of critical labor shortages in key war industries and the 
immense production output of American wartime industries stood as evidence that 
manpower mobilization was an overall success. However, he tempered this statement by 
pointing out that, despite the wartime rhetoric of politicians, the United States never truly 
mobilized for “total war.”
 
  Total mobilization of manpower required a level of unity that 
never existed within the U.S. McNutt’s efforts to achieve full mobilization of manpower 
resources were also hampered by the demands of interest groups, such as farmers and 
organized labor, social prejudice against women and African American workers, and 
regulations imposed by Congress, the War Department, and the Selective Service.59
Approaching the topic from a labor law perspective, Atleson considered the 
effects of state regulations on organized labor’s bargaining power during the war and the 
 
Flynn’s exploration of complications with manpower mobilization such as absenteeism, 
labor shortages, and companies that enticed each other’s employees away with higher 
wages, are helpful in an analysis of Real Silk’s labor problems. 
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lasting consequences in post-war labor law. In Labor and the Wartime State: Labor 
Relations and Law during World War II (1998), he stated that the extenuating 
circumstances of the war allowed the U.S. government to enact any labor policies 
necessary to keep American labor productive, without full regard as to the future costs. 
He concluded that the manpower mobilization program was ultimately detrimental to 
labor’s interests because government labor policies during WWII created the framework 
for formalized and restrictive post-war labor laws, such as the Taft-Hartley Act.60
As indicated throughout this essay, a great deal of scholarly literature has been 
published studying broad patterns in U.S. wartime economic policy, business-military-
government relations, and the administrative history of industrial mobilization. However, 
fewer local studies of war mobilization in individual states, cities, industries, or 
businesses exist in the literature. In his historiographical essay on WWII home front 
literature (2002), Allen Winkler cited only three significant local studies of wartime 
mobilization and economic policy, though others exist.
 
Atleson’s monograph provided an excellent overview of organized labor during the war 
that will inform a discussion of labor disputes with the American Federation of Hosiery 
Workers at Real Silk. 
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 Also, numerous state and city 
specific examinations of the social consequences of war production (race relations, 
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WWII home front histories of Evansville, South Bend, the Calumet Region, and the state 
61 Allan M. Winkler, “World War II Homefront: A Historiography,” OAH Magazine of History 16, 
no. 3 (Spring 2002): 5-6, 8. 
27 
of Indiana as a whole exist, but no sources specifically address Indianapolis.62
An article by Jim F. Heath provides one of the only sources dedicated to 
examining the mobilization experience of small businesses. In “American War 
Mobilization and the Use of Small Manufacturers, 1939-1943” (1972), Heath examined 
changes in government plans for mobilizing small manufacturers before and during U.S. 
involvement in WWII including anti-trust legislation; the inclusion of dollar-a-year big 
business representatives on key mobilization boards; and small manufacturers’ 
competition with giant corporations for contracts, raw materials, and funding for factory 
conversions. He argued that despite government efforts to include small business in the 
Smaller War Plants Corporation, the industrial mobilization structure never effectively 
incorporated small business. Instead, the “lion’s share” of contracts and resources went to 
big business.
 The few 
case studies that have emerged evaluate the mobilization program through the 
experiences of individual communities and industries. 
63
Two notable studies have been written on Indiana’s industrial mobilization efforts 
that contribute greatly to local literature on the state’s mobilization experience. In 1957, 
 Although Real Silk was not technically a “small business” that had 
difficulty obtaining war contracts, the company did encounter many of the same 
problems as small plants, especially competition for conversion funds and raw materials. 
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George M. Blackburn completed a dissertation titled “The Hoosier Arsenal” which 
provides the most comprehensive overview of war production in the state. Echoing the 
early, national histories of industrial mobilization, Blackburn traced the effect of WWII 
on Indiana’s industries from the beginning of the war through reconversion to civilian 
production. Relying heavily on local newspaper articles and the in-house publications of 
Indiana businesses, he discussed “the history of Indiana manufacturing during WWII[,] 
how manufacturing in the state met wartime demands, the role Indiana played in the 
national scene, and what effect war exerted on the Hoosier industrial structure.”64 Like 
many early histories of U.S. industrial mobilization, Blackburn sang the praises of 
Indiana industries’ contributions to the war effort, citing statistics of Indiana’s massive 
war production output gathered mainly from newspaper articles.65
Writing from an economic perspective, Bernard Friedman placed Indiana’s 
industrial mobilization within the greater context of the state’s economic mobilization 
program in his 1965 monograph, The Financial Role of Indiana in World War II. 
Friedman provided a particularly useful study of the economic aspects of Indiana’s 
industrial conversion to war production, describing the finances and resources necessary 
to build new plants or convert old ones.
 
66 Additionally, the author addressed the dilemma 
faced by smaller Indiana companies that found themselves caught between government 
pressure to stop all consumer production and a lack of financial support to convert to war 
production.67
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to handle vast orders of military supplies.68 Using primary sources from the war 
production agencies and the Indiana War History Commission for support, Friedman 
concluded that despite increased employment and production in the state, the 
expenditures introduced by the war far outweighed the money brought in by war 
production in Indiana.69
While Blackburn and Friedman provided valuable insight into Indiana’s 
mobilization program as a whole, there is room in the literature for more industry and 
business-specific studies of companies like the Real Silk Hosiery Mills. An excellent 
model for such a study can be found in Mark Wilson’s 2011 article “Making 'Goop' Out 
of Lemons: The Permanente Metals Corporation, Magnesium Incendiary Bombs, and the 
Struggle for Profits during World War II.” Wilson drew upon the same types of wartime 
records available for Real Silk including annual reports, business correspondence, and 
production statistics to illustrate the company’s interactions with wartime military, 
civilian, and government agencies and their struggles to remain profitable. Using the 
Permanente Metals Corporation’s (PMC) experimental magnesium-asphalt (goop) 
incendiary bombs as a case study, Wilson asserted that special government loans and 
profit guarantees did not remove all the risks involved in converting to war production. 
Through the wartime records of the PMC, Wilson demonstrated that PMC’s Hansgirg 
process for making magnesium was flawed and lost the company a great deal of money.
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The company then turned its attention to the production of magnesium bombs to help 
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recover its losses. However, government price regulations and competition from napalm 
and other incendiary devices limited the company’s profits and recovery.71
The company also experienced problems similar to those of Real Silk. For 
example, PMC began sustaining heavy losses when the Office of Price Administration 
(OPA) capped the price of magnesium. While this control was not a problem for larger 
corporations who possessed the resources necessary to produce magnesium at a lower 
price, PMC could not bring down production costs at its factory.
 
72 Unlike Real Silk, 
however, PMC was able to limit its losses and make a recovery by the end of the war.73
From the official histories of the government war production agencies to local 
case studies of specific industries, the literature delves into multiple perspectives on 
industrial mobilization including sociology, economics, the political economy of warfare, 
and local studies. While the national literature on industrial mobilization provides 
necessary context, local studies best illuminate the mobilization program’s impact by 
connecting government and military policies with their effect on specific businesses and 
communities. Indiana’s own literature on industrial mobilization illustrates how the local 
businesses and workforce adapted to the decisions and policies of government officials 
and the war production agencies. Analysis of industrial mobilization in the state as a 
whole and studies of several local communities have been completed. Yet no one has 
undertaken a comprehensive study of any of Indianapolis’s businesses in WWII. Due to 
their large output of war materials during WWII, Indianapolis’s industries provide an 
excellent subject for a case study that may help shed light on the WWII industrial 
mobilization experiences of Indianapolis businesses and the successes and failures of the 
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mobilization program at the local level. This thesis specifically builds on the work of 
Alexander Field and Jim Heath. Real Silk’s struggle during WWII provides a specific 
example of what Heath observed in his article about the disadvantaged position of 
smaller business during the war. The company’s WWII experience also provides support 
for Field’s thesis that U.S. productivity growth was greater before the war than it was 
during it. The case study of Real Silk also more broadly contributes to the mobilization 
literature that offers a more critical view of the WWII mobilization program’s success. 
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Chapter 2 
Real Silk Hosiery Mills Company History, 1921-1941 
On October 1, 1921, the Real Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc. (Real Silk) was 
incorporated in the State of Indiana. An outgrowth of a partnership founded in 1911, Real 
Silk re-incorporated under the same name two years later (1923) in Illinois to create the 
company that operated in Indianapolis into the 1950s.73 The company specialized in 
luxury items, producing ladies’ silk hosiery, ladies’ silk and rayon apparel, and silk 
lingerie. For men, Real Silk produced silk hosiery, underwear, neckwear, and shirts, 
among other products. The company’s silk stockings were one of the most popular items 
it produced. According a company bulletin, Real Silk’s hosiery was of better quality than 
most because it was manufactured with the most expensive grades of silk, stockings were 
enforced with more stitches per square inch, the costliest twist of thread was used to 
ensure that the silk fibers were strong enough to resist snags, and the hosiery was offered 
in a variety of sizes and lengths.74 Distribution was accomplished primarily through door-
to-door sales carried out by a force of nearly 10,000 salesmen in 250 district offices. The 
company also engaged in retail distribution and unbranded wholesale business.75
Real Silk experienced a general period of prosperity in the 1920s. Its earnings 
increased rapidly from 1927 to 1930, and the company grew into the “world’s largest silk 
 
                                                          
73 “Real Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc.,” Indiana War History Commission Report, p. 1, Box 76, Folder 
“Economic Changes—Manufacturing, Real Silk Hosiery Mills,” 29-N-3, Records of the Indiana War 
History Commission, Indiana State Archives (hereafter cited as IWHC-ISA); “Poor’s Industry and 
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Silk’s Customers’ Research,” Bulletin no. 1 (Fall 1939), Box 16, Folder 7, RSC-IHS. 
75 “Poor’s Industry and Investment Surveys: Apparel Industry,” (Wellesley, Mass.: Poor’s 
Publishing Co., 1939), 4—24, Box 17, Folder 10, RSC-IHS. 
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hosiery concern.”76 Eventually, the company expanded to include plants in Dalton, 
Georgia and Durant, Mississippi, although the Indianapolis plant remained the company’s 
largest factory and the site of its headquarters.77 In early 1930, the company developed a 
new 5-story plant in Indianapolis, which increased the factory’s production capacity by 
50 percent.78 This mill building and six others were located in Indianapolis with 
headquarters at 611 North Park Avenue.79
Like most companies, Real Silk’s sales suffered in the 1930s after the stock 
market crash. The company’s working capital declined rapidly from $4,555,000 in 1929 
to $391,000 in 1931. Poor’s Industry and Investment Survey reported Real Silk’s 
earnings throughout the 1930s as “irregular,” in part due to unstable silk prices. The 
company did not fully feel the effects of the Depression until 1932, when its profits 
reached an all-time low.
 
80 When Evansville native Gustav Efroymson joined the 
company in June 1932 and became its president, he minimized the damage and helped 
Real Silk recover gradually throughout the 1930s.81
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77 United States of America Smaller War Plants Corporation, “Report of Shipments, Orders and 
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Efroymson & Wolf, both Indianapolis department stores.82 Under the guidance of 
Efroymson, the company slowly but steadily re-built its working capital throughout the 
1930s and reached $1,829,000 in 1938. While company profits dwindled throughout the 
Great Depression, Real Silk still managed to stay in business and post a modest profit 
each year.83 Despite the negative effects of the Great Depression, the company’s annual 
sales volume grew from $5,000,000 to approximately $12,000,000 between 1923 and 
1939, and the company remained one of the nation’s largest manufacturers of hosiery, 
employing as many as 3,700 workers at a time.84
After overcoming the many obstacles presented by the Great Depression, Real 
Silk encountered new challenges in light of military conflicts between Japan and China, 
two of the world’s top raw silk producers.
 
85
                                                          
82 Secretary to G.A. Efroymson to Jackson Martindell, October 25, 1940, Box 21, Folder 9, RSC-
IHS. See also G.A. Efroymson to National Credit Office, Inc., December 29, 1939, Box 17, Folder 3, RSC-
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 An article in the company records indicated 
that approximately four-fifths of the silk used in the American market came from Japan, 
83 “Poor’s Industry and Investment Surveys: Apparel Industry” (Wellesley, Mass.: Poor’s 
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silk market, see “Poor’s Industry and Investment Surveys: Apparel Industry” (Wellesley, Mass.: Poor’s 
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85 Real Silk used the highest quality or grades of silk, which came from Japan and China. 
Although the company purchased silk from Italy as well, Italian silk was of lower quality than Japanese or 
Chinese grades because it had more gum in it, which took more time to clean and reduced the overall 
weight per bale. W.L. Caldwell to G.A. Efroymson, February 27, 1940, Box 20, Folder 21, RSC-IHS. See 
also annotations in “Market Price in Dollars Per Pound Grade ‘C’ Raw,” Year 1939, Box 22, Folder 11, 
RSC-IHS. 
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while the other fifth came from China and Italy.86 Real Silk relied on a silk purchaser, 
W.L. Caldwell, to track prices on the silk market and to purchase silk stocks for the 
company from suppliers such as E. Gerli & Co., Ltd. (Italy) and Katakura Co. (Japan).87
In 1937, Japan invaded China, beginning the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-
1945). As the Japanese took charge of areas in China, they also gained control of most of 
China’s major industries, including the silk industry.
 
88 The U.S. hosiery industry headed 
into trouble in 1939, as silk prices rose sharply from $1.84 per pound in December 1938 
to $4.325 in December 1939. Therefore, Real Silk invested a great deal more than usual 
in its raw silk inventories, weakening the company’s profitability in 1940.89
The silk market continued to worsen throughout 1940 for a variety of reasons. 
First, Japanese domestic consumption of silk increased, more than likely to cover the 
nation’s expanded needs for raw materials for war production.
 
90 In a January 1940 report 
to Efroymson on the silk market, silk buyer Frederic Huntington indicated that increased 
volume of domestic consumption in Japan, whether real or speculative, would produce a 
shortage of Japanese-grade silk later that year. According to Huntington, the Japanese 
predicted that their consumption of silk would continue to increase.91
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 Second, Japanese 
dominance in silk production, coupled with its control of the Chinese silk industry, 
allowed the nation to set prices on the international market. In September 1940, the 
87 See documents in Box 20, Folders 21-23, RSC-IHS. 
88 Jane Golley, The Dynamics of Chinese Regional Development: Market Nature, State Nature 
(Northhampton: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2007), 87; Parks M. Coble, Chinese Capitalists in 
Japan's New Order: The Occupied Lower Yangzi, 1937-1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2003), 42-45. 
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Raw,” Year 1939, Box 22, Folder 11, RSC-IHS. 
90 Institute of Economic Timing, Inc., “Silk Report,” April 27, 1940, Box 21, Folder 15, RSC-IHS. 
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Japanese government was poised to purchase the controlling amount of silk produced in 
the Far East and remove it from the market. Caldwell expressed concern about possible 
price fixing in the near future writing, “the purchase and removal from the market of 
75,000 bales of silk by the Japanese Government could easily put them in a position to 
squeeze this market if such is their intention.” According to Caldwell, the Japanese could 
force the price of raw silk as high as $3.50 per pound, compared to prices below $3 in the 
previous months.92
The escalation of European military conflicts in 1940 further destabilized the silk 
market and expanded competition for this increasingly scarce raw material. As Great 
Britain, Germany, and Italy mobilized for war, demands for silk to make parachutes and 
other war materials increased. For example, in June 1940, Caldwell reported that the 
Canadian Government purchased 400 bales of silk in a grade that Real Silk often 
purchased, leaving the market for this type of silk “fairly well picked over.” The 
Canadians purchased and reserved the silk to make parachutes for the British war effort.
  
93
Another factor which we must take into consideration is the fact that Italy 
will not be able to furnish any more silk and the Japanese realizing this 
condition and controlling the output from the Chinese filatures have seen 
to it that the China silk advanced to within approximately 15 [cents] of the 
Japan 20/22’s [a specific grade of raw silk]. Elimination of the 
 
Additionally, when Italy, the world’s third largest silk producer, entered the war on June 
10, 1940, the nation effectively took its raw silk off the international market. Caldwell 
noted that elimination of Italian competition further empowered the Japanese government 
to raise silk prices. He wrote to Efroymson: 
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competition heretofore offered by the Italian silk has made this move 
possible.94
 
 
The turbulent conditions of the 1940 silk market were, in large part, responsible 
for company losses of $482, 329.86 in the first six months of the year.95 In a letter to silk 
supplier Paolino Gerli, Efroymson wrote, “I am a little ashamed to show my face, after 
the terrible results we showed for the first six months of this year. I hope things will be 
better the last half, but conditions do not seem to be any too favorable in the hosiery 
line.”96 The situation did improve somewhat, as the factory managed to eke out a profit 
of $140,374.18 in the last 6 months; however, the company ultimately finished in the red 
for the year, losing $341,955.68.97
In the face of an uncertain silk market, Real Silk looked to the future and sought 
substitutes for silk thread. Company records indicate that management considered a 
variety of new yarns developed by American chemical companies including vynalite, 
vinyon, and nylon.
 
98 The company already used a semi-synthetic fiber, rayon, in some of 
its products.99
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 Nylon was perhaps the most promising synthetic on the market to replace 
silk. Manufactured by the DuPont chemical company, nylon yarn was marketed by 
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expected to have these products available for sale around May 15, 1940.100 Women 
flocked to department stores to purchase the new nylon stockings, but many were 
disappointed by small stocks, as DuPont could not produce enough nylon to meet 
nationwide demand.101 Real Silk’s production and sale of nylon stockings was not 
enough to erase the losses of early 1940. Nevertheless, Efroymson assured stockholders 
in the 1940 annual report that the company continued to modernize the factory and install 
more equipment to produce nylon hosiery.102
As war raged in Asia and Europe, the United States remained out of the “fighting 
war.” However, as the government prepared for possible military mobilization in the near 
future, some companies converted all or part of their facilities to war production to fill 
educational orders that the military assigned to test production capacity. In March 1941, 
the United States entered into a Lend-Lease agreement with the allies, effectively ending 
American neutrality. The nation remained out of the conflict militarily, but agreed to 
supply the allies. As such, more American companies became involved in producing war 
materials that were shipped overseas.
 
103
However, Americans remained divided over the issue of U.S. intervention in the 
European conflict. Isolationists led by the America First Committee argued against 
American involvement in what they viewed to be a strictly European conflict. 
Interventionists, on the other hand, supported direct military involvement in the war. The 
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state of Indiana, where Real Silk was headquartered, contained one of the most 
isolationist populations in the nation.104
I am glad to see that you are in favor of revising the Neutrality Law and 
hope that Congress will soon pass the law revising the present Neutrality 
Law and allowing our country to sell arms and ammunitions and various 
war supplies to any country that can come and get them on a cash and 
carry plan. I am certainly in favor of doing everything possible to keep this 
country out of war. I feel however, that by revising the Neutrality Law and 
perhaps being of help to the Allies in this way, we will be helping 
ourselves and be much more likely to keep out of the war than if we refuse 
to sell war materials, etc., to the Allies who are undoubtedly much more 
our friends than the ones they are fighting.
 Real Silk president Gustav Efroymson stood 
somewhere between the interventionists and the isolationists. In 1939, he expressed his 
middle-ground stance in the war debate in a letter to Indiana U.S. Senator Frederic Van 
Nuys: 
105
 
 
Far from neutral, Efroymson was involved in various organizations that provided 
aid and relief to the Allies. For example, he was a member of the board directors of the 
Jewish Welfare Fund,106 he served on the board of directors of the National Refugee 
Service, Inc.,107 he donated money to the United Committee for French Relief,108 and he 
was involved in the Fighting Fund for Finland in Indianapolis.109 Efroymson was also an 
active member in Indianapolis’s Jewish community. He received many requests from 
Jews in Germany to write affidavits financially supporting their immigration to the 
United States. He helped several Jews leave Germany, including some of his relatives.110
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Despite the company management’s personal views of U.S. intervention in the 
war, Real Silk did not develop its war contracts department until February 1942.111 The 
war increased foreign trade with Europe, especially after the U.S. government introduced 
Lend-Lease. The expansion of military spending not only increased war production, but 
also boosted average income levels in areas with high concentrations of war-related 
industries. Real Silk and many manufacturing organizations tracked the locations of new 
defense industries as they sprang up across the nation and looked to these cities as 
potential new markets due to increases in employment and disposable income.112 The 
National Association of Direct Selling Companies113 and the National Association of 
Manufacturers, organizations to which Real Silk belonged, even advised their members 
on the new markets opening up. Efroymson kept one finger on the pulse of the growing 
national defense market and put out feelers to potential markets for the company’s 
traditional products. For example, he wrote to the Red Cross inquiring whether or not the 
organization bought hosiery for their nurses’ uniforms.114
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sell some of its traditional textile goods to the military, as a 1943 report indicates that the 
factory shipped $873,922 of war goods in 1941 before the factory’s conversion.115
Real Silk saw no reason to immediately convert to defense production, choosing 
instead to capitalize on the ancillary markets that sprung up around war industries. The 
company was not alone in its slow conversion. In 1942, the WPB surveyed 20 durable 
goods industries and found that by the end of March, while all of these industries had 
accepted war contracts, the bulk of their shipments remained civilian products.
 
116
Sources suggest that the company was making a comeback in 1941 irrespective of 
the economic benefits of increased military spending. As historian Alexander Field points 
out in a 2008 article, military spending between 1939 and 1941 was not mainly 
responsible for the rise in Total Factor Productivity between those two years. Army and 
Navy spending in 1940 and 1941 combined amounted to only 3.2 percent of the total 
military spending from 1940-1946.
 
117 In fact, military production in 1941 comprised less 
than one-fifth of total production for the year, while civilian production increased 
markedly.118
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in the same year.119 By the end of the year, the company had pulled itself out of the losses 
of 1940 and managed to turn a net profit of $501, 438.12.120
For Real Silk, the first major push toward conversion came in early August 1941. 
On August 2, the Office of Production Management (OPM) and the Office of Price 
Administration and Civilian Supply (OPACS) froze all silk supplies across the nation and 
placed these supplies under their control.
 
121 For Real Silk, this action meant that its entire 
stock of silk—422 bales—was purchased at ceiling prices and seized by the 
government.122 Additionally, the allotment of silk substitutes and other textile materials 
for war products restricted their availability for the civilian market, leaving few options 
open to the company. Blackburn points out that shortages of raw materials and 
government redirection of materials to war industry impelled many manufacturers to 
enter war production to receive priority ratings necessary to obtain raw materials. 
Government curtailment of civilian production and raw material shortages resulted in 
“priorities unemployment” for some businesses. Employment in these plants dropped as 
production stopped temporarily or plants shut down permanently. Blackburn specifically 
cites the silk freeze as an example of “priorities unemployment” in Indiana, as mills in 
both Indianapolis and Fort Wayne were forced to stop all production for a short time until 
they could obtain silk substitutes.123
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the top five employers in Indianapolis with a workforce of approximately three thousand. 
After the order from OPACS and OPM in 1941, Real Silk was forced to scale back its 
operations until employment dropped below 2,000.124 If the company wished to continue 
manufacturing, Real Silk had little choice but to jump on the bandwagon and convert part 
of its facilities to war production, as this was the only way to obtain the raw materials 
necessary to continue operating the factory.125
In early September 1941, Efroymson telephoned the Almar Manufacturing 
Company to seek advice on how to obtain war contracts and how to prepare the factory 
for such work. He explained: 
 
We are anxious to know what be needed in the way of machinery 
equipment, etc., in fact [we] would like to get all the information we can. 
We are very anxious to get some of this defense work. I was told in 
Washington they are anxious to get people working on it. In addition, we 
have some silk, frozen by the government and we would like to have the 
government release it so we could have it thrown and woven and ma[d]e 
into parachutes.126
 
 
Real Silk sold all the machinery in its throwing department, including over one 
hundred of its full-fashioned knitting machines to clear 51,300 square feet of floor space 
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Property-Surplus Liquidators, Inc. [electronic resource]: hearings before the United States Senate Special 
Committee To Investigate the National Defense Program, Seventy-Eighth Congress, second session and 
Seventy-Ninth Congress, first session, on Jan. 19, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 6-8, 14, 1945 (Washington: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1945), 12878 (hereafter cited as Truman Committee Hearing). 
126 “Report on telephone conversation between Mr. Efroymson and Mr. Leon Herbst, Almar 
Manufacturing Company,” September 8, 1941, Box 29, Folder 1, RSC-IHS. 
44 
that would become the company’s new war production department.127 The company 
began taking on war business in its new department in late January 1942, and its first 
contracts came from such agencies as the Philadelphia Quartermaster Division, the 
Jeffersonville Quartermaster Division, and the Army Air Forces at Wright Field in 
Dayton, Ohio.128 By July 11, 1942, the company’s Indianapolis plant had acquired 
$2,187,803 worth of defense contracts.129 Real Silk most often worked as a sub-
contractor for war goods, with a few exceptions. The company balked at acting as the 
primary contractor for military contracts because payments from the government and the 
military often proved unreliable. Payment was much more prompt when they acted as a 
subcontractor on other companies’ primary contracts.130
Conversion to war production had immediate negative effects on Real Silk. The 
company’s net profit dropped from over $500,000 in 1941 to $76,208.68 in 1942.
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 War 
production delivered what historian Alexander Field called a “one-two punch” to 
individual companies and the American economy in general, as large amounts of 
resources and energy were diverted to first convert factories to war production and then 
to reconvert them to peace-time production after the war. Factories had to expand their 
facilities, retool existing ones, develop new manufacturing processes for unfamiliar 
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product lines, and retrain their workforces. Conversion cost businesses a great deal of 
money and ground productivity to a near halt until factories had fully adapted. 
In the company’s 1942 annual report, Efroymson told shareholders that in the past 
year, the company had expended large amounts of money on retooling the factory for 
new war products and training new employees to make these products. He also explained 
that a great deal of money had been lost on war contracts to date. However, Efroymson 
expressed hope that profitable war contracts would make up for the losses of the previous 
year and offset the money spent on new machinery and employee training. Ultimately he 
placed his hope in war contracts to pull the company out of the hole; but for Real Silk, 
the war would bring neither immediate nor long-term economic prosperity. A slew of 
complications due to material shortages, wartime government regulations, and changes in 
the labor force stunted the company’s growth. 
46 
Chapter 3 
Material Shortages and Government Regulations 
One of the greatest logistical undertakings in U.S. history, WWII industrial 
mobilization encompassed a vast array of complex relationships between government and 
military officials, local communities, and business owners. The circumstances of war 
required greater government regulation of the economy and industry to harness the 
nation’s productive capacity. A plethora of new agencies and commissions were created 
to manage the nation’s resources, including the National Defense Advisory Council 
(NDAC), Office of Production Management (OPM), War Production Board (WPB), the 
Supply Priorities and Allocations Board (SPAB), Office of Defense Transportation 
(ODT), and the Smaller War Plants Corporation (SWPC). These organizations 
continually created new policies that affected U.S. industries involved in war production, 
and despite their many attempts to create an effective system of regulations for the 
nation’s industrial mobilization program, their policies often caused as many problems as 
they resolved for businesses. In 2008, historian Alexander Field perceptively noted: 
Mobilization required that managers and workers pay attention not only to 
the wrenching tasks of re-orienting production within and between sectors, 
but also to a panoply of regulations associated with government 
contracting and resource allocation in what, within the military and much 
of the civilian sector, approached a command economy.133
 
 
Records of the civilian mobilization agencies (OPM, SPAB, and WPB), provide 
an access point through which to connect the experience of local businesses to national 
developments. These agencies were responsible for overseeing the entire mobilization 
program, including the production of military supplies and equipment and the regulation 
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of raw materials.134
In 1944, the Indiana War History Commission, a state organization created to 
record Indiana’s contributions during World War II, conducted a survey of state 
industries and their war production efforts.
 More importantly, the meeting minutes of these agencies discuss the 
flaws in other agencies’ policies and the impact these complications had on U.S. 
industries. Together with Real Silk’s wartime records, meeting minutes of the civilian 
agencies illustrate how the regulatory policies of wartime civilian and military agencies 
impeded effective operations in some businesses during the war. 
135 The survey asked businesses what war 
products they manufactured, what difficulties they encountered during conversion to war 
production and with actual production, and with whom they contracted, among other 
pertinent questions. When asked about problems with shortages of equipment, materials, 
and skilled labor, Real Silk optimistically reported “our overall picture as far as 
equipment materials and employees has been very satisfactory.”136 The report cited only 
two contracts as exceptions to this pleasant portrayal of the company’s wartime 
experience. Furthermore, the report boasted “we have been very prompt on all of our 
schedules,” with the exceptions mentioned above.137
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 However, Real Silk’s wartime 
records tell a different story and their statements to the Indiana War History Commission 
veil the many obstacles the company faced from start to finish during the war, 
particularly during the company’s conversion and early months working on war contracts 
from 1942 to1943. Unfortunately, existing records of the company’s war business span 
135 For more on the Indiana War History Commission see John D. Barnhart, “The Indiana War 
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only from 1942 to1943, but this small window into Real Silk’s wartime experience 
provides a vivid picture of the new obstacles the war presented. Contract summaries in 
the company’s records report difficulties encountered on approximately 46 percent of 
their war contracts in 1942 alone.138
Throughout the war, Real Silk manufactured everyday necessities for soldiers 
such as bakers’ coats and aprons, sandfly and mosquito bars (protective netting), 
mountain tents, and shelter halves. They also produced munitions-related items such as 
drag sleeves for flares, wing covers, and parachutes for cargo, aerial deliveries, M390 
radios, and M-72 and M-40 fragmentation bombs.
 Though the war promised to bring increased 
production output and opportunities for profit, it turned out to be a veritable labyrinth of 
bureaucratic red tape, restrictive policies, and material shortages that prevented Real Silk 
from reaching its production and profit goals. 
139 Surprisingly, Real Silk rejected 
some offers to bid on clothing items including wool socks, slips, pajamas, twill trousers, 
cotton stockings, and bath robes, as either the factory’s machines could not meet the 
construction specifications for the items or the company’s bids were too high to be 
competitive.140 The factory also continued to make civilian products, in reduced 
quantities, as government regulations permitted.141
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Like most American companies, Real Silk highlighted its contributions to the war 
effort whenever possible. During the war, patriotism sold. In a letter to company 
shareholders, Efroymson proudly stated that, “In taking these large war contracts and 
doing everything in our power to supply needed products for the government we feel that 
our company has made a large contribution to the war effort. . .”142 Patriotism and war 
production also featured prominently in the company newsletter, The Real News, to boost 
employee morale and promote the company’s war work.143 Real Silk was so exuberant in 
highlighting its war work that the company was chastised by the U.S. Ordnance 
Department Chief for attempting to display this information in a department store 
advertisement to promote civilian products. Publicizing such sensitive information about 
war products was considered a security risk.144
Real Silk also received written commendations for their good work on several 
contracts.
 
145 However, the textile manufacturer fell short of earning the iconic army and 
navy “E” awards. Manufacturers earned “E” awards if their facilities were deemed 
“particularly outstanding in production for the War and Navy Departments.”146 About 
five percent of eligible companies nationwide received the award, but many companies 
like Real Silk strove to earn this coveted award.147
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the managers’ control, Real Silk failed to perform on several fronts including maintaining 
a low absentee rate, preventing work stoppages, and overcoming production obstacles. 
Unfortunately, the few contracts for which the company did receive 
commendations were the exception, not the rule. In 1942, Real Silk was late in fulfilling 
many war contracts and lost money on the greater part of them.148 The company’s war 
contracts division simply could not stay on track in the face of wartime obstacles. Real 
Silk’s records include a series of weekly reports that contain statistical information about 
the production output for each war contract. When one compares the scheduled vs. actual 
production for each week, it is apparent that the factory was not meeting its production 
goals for most of its contracts. While the company reached or exceeded its goals some 
weeks, in many cases production fell well below the weekly goal. This trend also carried 
over to the projected production to date vs. the actual production to date statistics. These 
statistics provide evidence that the company’s Indianapolis factory was not producing at 
its predicted capacity.149 Furthermore, in a report of the profits and losses on war 
contracts filled prior to August 15, 1942, Real Silk had lost money on 6 out of 8 
contracts.150
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statements for the period ended November 21, 1942 showed losses on goods shipped.151 
Other reports demonstrate losses on an additional 9 contracts in 1942.152
The company’s problems began with its position within the wartime economy as a 
mid-size company in a low-priority industry. Throughout WWII, big businesses had 
ample opportunity to gain a leg up on smaller businesses. The military preferred to work 
with larger companies who had the resources, experience, and capacity to produce 
essential military items quickly.
 
153 It is clear that larger corporations took on the lion’s 
share of contract work during the war. In his article “American War Mobilization and the 
Use of Small Manufacturers, 1939-1943,” Jim Heath points out that “[b]etween June 
1940 and December 1941, the nation’s 100 largest companies had received over three-
fourths of all primary war supply contracts...”154 Not only did these companies dominate 
the WWII manufacturing market, their wartime share of manufacturing contracts far 
exceeded their “share of prewar production.”155 The military was also more willing to 
dole out large amounts of money for conversion of existing facilities and the building of 
new facilities to large businesses, especially those that pursued high-priority industries 
such as petroleum, steel, metalworking, and aircraft.156
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On the other hand, smaller manufacturers were either forced out of business as the 
government curtailed civilian production, or they struggled to compete with larger 
companies for contracts.157 In Indiana, 2,455 businesses terminated between June 1940 
and August 1942, a large portion of which were in the wholesale and retail and 
manufacturing sectors, which encompassed Real Silk’s main sectors of operation.158 
Though 3,017 companies “became liable” during the same time period, the more than 
two thousand that did not survive offer evidence that the war changed the U.S. economy 
by shrinking some industries while expanding others.159 The WPB’s Planning Committee 
pushed the military to consider spreading the wealth by directly “farming out” contracts 
through district offices or forcing large companies to subcontract. The military was 
reluctant to pursue the former route, because it would have to “make necessary provision 
for increased tolerances, higher prices, and larger inspectional forces.”160
The WPB’s Planning Committee further recommended that the government 
decentralize “authority to place contracts” as doing so was “essential if the smaller plants, 
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less well-known to Washington officials, are to be fully utilized.”161 The government 
recognized to some extent the negative impact that wartime economic policies would 
have on smaller businesses across the nation, and attempted to address the problem. At a 
WPB meeting to discuss aid for small businesses, the agency acknowledged that, “[t]he 
War Production Board must realize the full implications of any decision it makes, the 
probable addition to the number of business casualties, and the personal economic 
tragedies already caused by its efforts to further the war production program.”162 The 
WPB considered multiple avenues that might aid small businesses. Several of WPB’s 
suggestions were enacted in Congress including the creation of a division dedicated to 
appropriating contracts and sub-contracts to small businesses, an organization that 
offered financing for small business conversions, and efforts to concentrate civilian 
production in a select number of factories to sustain them through the war.163 If factories 
could not convert, then relief measures would be provided for some companies that were 
“adversely affected by the war” or forced out of business.164
As the War Production Board struggled to maximize industrial output, it targeted 
smaller manufacturers as untapped sources of additional manufacturing capacity. On June 
11, 1942, Congress enacted the Small Business Mobilization Act which created a Smaller 
War Plants Division (SWPD) of the WPB and a Smaller War Plants Corporation 
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(SWPC). SWPD was charged with the task to “promote the conversion of small plants to 
war production,”165 while the SWPC was created to finance the conversions.166 The aid 
program, which targeted manufacturers employing less than 500 workers, managed to 
allot 86,000 contracts to businesses with fewer than 100 workers or 35 percent of the total 
number of contracts awarded to all companies in the peak war production year of 1943. 
Yet these contracts accounted for only 3.5 percent of the total value of all war contracts 
for that year. The most lucrative contracts continued to be awarded to larger 
manufacturers. These contracts also did little to slow the attrition of smaller 
manufacturers. In 1939, small businesses which employed fewer than 100 workers 
“accounted for 26 percent of total U.S. manufacturing output,” but throughout the war 
years, this percentage decreased to 19 percent.167
Real Silk’s size fell somewhere between the top 100 corporations and the small 
businesses represented by the SWPD. With between 2,000 and 3,000 employees at any 
given time, the textile company did not fall within the SWPD’s target size for aid (fewer 
than 500 employees). While the SWPC eventually did offer assistance to Real Silk, the 
offer came more than a year too late to assist with the factory’s conversion to war 
production. The division formed several months after Real Silk’s conversion, and the 
company did not receive a “request for aid” form from the SWPC until May 12, 1943.
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did.169 In Indianapolis, companies such as Curtiss Wright Corporation (Propeller 
Division), General Motors Corporation (Allison Division), and Bridgeport Brass 
Company received public funds to expand their facilities or purchase additional 
manufacturing equipment. However, Real Silk does not appear on the list of war 
industrial facilities publicly or privately funded.170 Instead, the company funded its own 
conversion.171 In the annual report for 1942, Efroymson reported, “Your company has 
converted a large portion of its plant facilities to the production of war materiel under 
contracts with our government, and has expended a considerable sum of money for new 
machinery needed to manufacture such materiel.” He also expressed his hope that the 
coming year’s war production would offset these expenses.172
Real Silk’s middle position in the wartime market also affected the company’s 
ability to compete for contracts. Larger concerns had greater resources at their command 
and with larger facilities, these companies could produce at larger volumes, and thus a 
lower price per piece.
 Efroymson would, 
however, be disappointed by the miniscule profits made on some contracts and the 
outright losses incurred on others. Essentially, the company fell through the cracks of the 
mobilization program. 
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manufacturer of M-40 and M-26 parachutes and was successful enough in this endeavor 
that the WPB requested that the company allow smaller manufacturers to tour their M-40 
production line. Such tours were intended to help manufacturers new to war work plan 
their own M-40 production. Yet in sharing their secrets with smaller companies, Real 
Silk created more competition for these contracts. O.P. Larson, the company’s war 
contracts representative, expressed his concern about introducing multiple small 
manufacturers to M-40 chute production in a company letter. He wrote: 
…[T]he government is asking any number of small manufacturers to begin 
making these M-40 Fragmentation Bomb chutes; that they will be getting 
a lot of new people into this work, small manufacturers, who will have 
practically no overhead.  The War Production Board will probably give 
these people priorities for machines whereas they will not give us any 
priorities.  This leads up to the fact that when the Ordnance people want 
some more of these M-40s they will have educated a lot of small people in 
the manufacture of them who can bid much lower than we can due to 
smaller overhead, lower piece rates, etc.174
 
 
In effect, the WPB asked Real Silk to become complicit in creating its own 
competition with smaller companies that had lower overhead costs. Obtaining fair prices 
on contracts also presented a new challenge for the company. Sometimes they had to bid 
low on contracts knowing they would lose money because in order to obtain any work at 
all, they had to meet the demands of the military which constantly drove down prices.175
Size was not the only issue facing companies like Real Silk. The type of industry 
and the war products a company manufactured affected its position in the wartime 
economy as well. Unlike airplanes, tanks, and guns, textile products, though essential in 
sustaining soldiers, were not high-priority, high-profit items prized by the military during 
the war. As the U.S. Director of Procurement in the Quartermaster Corps explained in a 
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letter to the company officials, “As there is no ‘glamour’ attached to the production of 
clothing and Equipage items, many people have a false impression of the re-lationship 
[sic] between the needle industry and the items required for War.”176 Many of Real Silk’s 
contracts came from regional branches of the Quartermaster, and in general, the 
mobilization program accorded the Quartermaster Corps and its equipment a low priority 
status.177 Additionally, the Textile Workers Union of America observed that the 
mobilization agencies, as well as military and government contractors, accorded the 
textile industry little attention and did not “[conceive] of the industry as a unit to be 
guided to the most economic production and greatest usefulness.”178
Aside from their overall disadvantaged position in the war production market, 
Real Silk encountered obstacles to production in many stages of the manufacturing 
process from obtaining raw materials to transporting finished goods off the lot. Before the 
war, Real Silk was used to controlling the purchase of raw materials (especially silk), 
designing its own products, engineering the manufacturing process, conducting its own 
inspections, and overseeing the transportation and distribution of its own goods. 
However, under new wartime regulations, the textile manufacturer and other companies 
lost a great deal of autonomy over their operations.
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See also Thos. W. Jones, to Real Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc., September 14, 1942, Box 29, Folder 5, RSC-IHS. 
 In the prewar economy, Real Silk 
had control over purchasing, stocking, and allotting raw materials for its products. For 
example, the company had a silk buyer who monitored the international silk markets in 
Japan, China, and Italy and purchased silk at the lowest prices possible according to the 
177 Erna Risch, The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume I 
(Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1995), 59. 
178 Truman Committee Hearing, 12879. 
179 For more on how government regulations and bureaucratic red tape interfered with business 
operations, see Blackburn, “Hoosier Arsenal,” 373-376. 
58 
factory’s estimated needs for the year.180 However, after the United States entered the 
war, many of the materials that Real Silk used in its civilian products fell under new 
controls. Also, when the company took on war contracts, the factory’s management had 
little control over the purchasing, allotment, or distribution of materials required for each 
contract. Control over many raw materials lay with the civilian mobilization agencies, the 
Army-Navy Munitions Board (ANMB),181
When the Army initiated its Munitions Program in the summer of 1940, material 
shortages quickly became apparent. Early shortages included cotton, linen, and flannel 
for uniforms, cotton duck and webbing for tents and other canvas items, and machine 
tools.
 and individual military contractors such as the 
Ordnance Department or Quartermaster Corps Division. These organizations distributed 
materials based upon priority and allocation systems. 
182
                                                          
180 Real Silk’s main silk buyer was W.L. Caldwell. See Box 20, Folders 21-23, in RSC-IHS for 
documents pertaining to the company’s silk purchases. 
 To help manage such shortages, the ANMB set up a priorities system. This 
system ranked goals of the military mobilization program from the highest to the lowest 
priority according to the urgency of the military’s need for certain materials to support 
the strategic plans of the Armed Forces. These priorities were “placed upon production 
orders to industry” and also on materials required for this production. The first priorities 
system, approved on August 12, 1940, ranked “military procurement objectives into ten 
degrees of urgency” with ratings from A-1 to A-10. For example the A-1 category 
encompassed all equipment for the Regular Army and National Guard forces, while the 
181 The Army-Navy Munitions Board was a joint military board created in 1922. It served five 
major functions during WWII. It stockpiled raw, semi-finished, and finished goods to supply the American 
military; assigned priorities; “maximiz[ed] the availability of machine tools”; and regulated foreign 
purchases of American weapons and other military products. David M. Kennedy, ed., The Library of 
Congress World War II Companion (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007), 212; Koistinen, Arsenal of 
World War II, 115. 
182 R. Elberton Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1959), 505-506. 
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A-7 rating encompassed the less-urgent expansion of existing industrial facilities and the 
construction of new ones that would produce Air Force and Army equipment. The system 
also included an AA rating for emergency procurement situations. However, the 
classifications were so vague that a disproportionate number of procurement orders 
received A-1 ratings, and priority inflation quickly plagued the system.183
By November 1940, the situation was so critical that the ANMB had to separate 
the A-1 category into 10 sub-categories: A-1-a to A-1-j.Gradually, the civilian agencies, 
beginning with NDAC, took partial responsibility for overseeing the priorities system. 
ANMB and the civilian agencies recognized that military goals could not be achieved 
without balanced procurement goals. For example, resources could be heavily 
concentrated in the A-1 category to create much-needed planes, but unless sufficient 
materials were directed to make machine guns, a lower category item, the planes would 
be unarmed. Despite various attempts to create a more balanced procurement program, 
inflation persisted. In 1942, the military concentrated 56 percent of its procurement 
spending in the top A-1-a category. The rating just below it received only twelve percent 
of these military funds, and funding diminished even more greatly in the lower 
categories.
 
184 On June 12, 1942, the ANMB issued yet another addition to the rating 
system: AA-1 to AA-4.  These new “superratings” created priorities above the A-1-a 
category. In this system, approximately 50 percent of the items procured by the military 
in 1942 fell into the AA-1 rating alone, spurring the WPB to vehemently oppose aspects 
of this new system.185
                                                          
183 Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization, 509-510, 519-522; “Revised Preference Ratings 
Proposed by the Army and Navy Munitions Board,” Meeting XXXVI: May 27, 1942, WPBC, 59. 
 
184 Ibid., 521-523. 
185 Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization, 524-5. 
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In May 1942, the WPB considered the revised Preference Ratings system 
proposed by the ANMB. The planning committee pointed out two major problems with 
the latest classifications. First, the new AA ratings excluded all essential civilian and 
indirect military production. However, as the ratings stood, the AA categories would 
consume most of the scarce raw materials. The WPB predicted that this change would 
hamper the maintenance of railroads, trucks, and public facilities and threaten the already 
dangerously low levels of civilian production that were sustaining the civilian economy, 
morale, and workforce.186
Second, the loose definitions for each category left too much room for 
inflation.
 
187 Nearly the entire military program fell under the AA rating, which placed a 
huge strain on the U.S. economy and industry as it stood in 1942.188 Despite the WPB’s 
concerns, President Roosevelt approved the ANMB’s new ratings system with the 
stipulation that essential civilian requirements must be incorporated into the higher 
ratings. While one of the WPB’s criticisms was addressed, the chairman still expressed 
concern that the system would quickly exhaust available resources since the ratings were 
not “restricted to a small portion of total productive resources.”189
                                                          
186 Meeting XVIII: May 26, 1942, “New Army and Navy Munitions Board Priority Ratings,” WPB 
Minutes, 71. 
 The procurement 
agencies and the military allocated materials based upon annual production objectives, 
but the WPB argued that such a strategy provided “no security against excessive and 
187 Meeting XXXVI: May 27, 1942, “Revised Preference Ratings Proposed by the Army and Navy 
Munitions Board,” WPBPC, 59; Robert R. Nathan to Donald M. Nelson, Memo, Planning Committee 
Recommendation No. 7, Memorandum, “Subject: Proposed Rerating System of the ANMB,” May 27, 
1942, WPBPC, 138-9. 
188 Robert R. Nathan to Donald M. Nelson, Memo, Planning Committee Recommendation No. 7, 
Memorandum, “Subject: Proposed Rerating System of the ANMB,” May 27, 1942, WPBPC, 138-9. 
189 Meeting XXXIX: June 9, 1942, “Revised Preference Ratings Proposed by the Army and Navy 
Munitions Board,” WPBPC, 62. 
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unbalanced production in particular months.”190 WPB predicted that shortages in 
materials would be the greatest contributing factor to delays in munitions production, and 
“[t]he imperfections of the priorities system were declared responsible for the present 
failure of raw materials to flow evenly into war production.”191
Shortages, inadequate flow of raw materials, and delays in material deliveries 
prevalent under the flawed priorities system caused numerous problems for Real Silk’s 
production lines.
 
192 Real Silk began encountering military and government restrictions of 
their production materials as early as December 1941. For example, the Office of 
Production Management Director of Purchases sent a letter to all hosiery manufacturers 
requesting that they respond to shortages or threatened shortages in certain dyestuffs by 
reducing the number of color shades offered in their civilian products. OPM suggested 
that Real Silk and similar manufacturers simplify their color lines to preserve dyestuff 
that might be needed for national defense purposes.193 Shortages of wool, another 
material used in some of the factory’s products, appeared in late 1941 as well.194
                                                          
190 Meeting 61: November 5, 1942, “Program Scheduling and Production Control,” WPBPC, 98. 
 At this 
point in time, conservation of scarce materials was a request, not a command. However, 
as the war dragged on, these requests turned into mandates. 
191 Meeting X: March 16, 1942, “War Munitions Program,” WPBPC, 20. 
192 Problems with material flow were common in the textile industry. In a 1943 Executive Council 
Report to the Third Biennial Convention of the Textile Workers Union of America (TWUA), the Union 
identified several flaws in the mobilization program that made regular employment, and thus regular 
production output, difficult to maintain. Chief among these was the irregular flow of raw materials, 
machine parts, and orders, as well as disruptive swings in production demand from pressure production to 
complete lulls in production. Truman Committee Hearing, 12878. 
193 Douglas C. MacKeachie to “Each Hosiery Manufacturer,” December 29, 1941, Box 29, Folder 
3, RSC-IHS. 
194 The Civilian Production Administration, Bureau of Demobilization, Meeting XIX—December 
23, 1941, “Wool,” in Minutes of the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board, September 2, 1941, to 
January 15, 1942, Historical Reports and War Administration: War Production Board Documentary 
Publication No.3 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1946), 50; Risch, 
Quartermaster Corps, Vol. I, 69. 
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In 1942, the WPB froze all existing inventories of silk, rubber yarn, and elastic 
thread used in making textiles. The WPB informed textile companies that due to the 
rubber shortage, Conservation Order M-124 froze their stocks of rubber-based threads 
and required the companies to report all of their stocks to the WPB so that the agency 
could determine what should be appropriated for military and civilian purposes.195 The 
same type of order applied to silk stocks. Although manufacturers sought substitutes (i.e., 
rayon and nylon) to alleviate the silk shortages, replacement materials soon became 
scarce as well.196 These material shortages and restrictions, coupled with government 
curtailment of non-essential civilian production, forced Real Silk to convert to war 
production and become increasingly dependent upon war contracts to sustain the factory 
through wartime.197
Delays in material deliveries to Real Silk caused setbacks in several of the 
company’s war contracts. Perhaps one of the company’s most problematic sub-contracts 
was with the McInerney Spring and Wire Company of Grand Rapids, Michigan, 
constructing parachutes for M-40 fragmentation bombs.
 
198
                                                          
195 War Production Board: Textile, Clothing, and Leather Branch, “Stocks of Rubber Yarn and 
Elastic Thread as of April 25, 1942,” May 8, 1942, Box 30, Folder 7, RSC-IHS; J. Bruce McCullough, “To 
All Holders of Rubber Yarn and Elastic Thread,” April 21, 1942, Box 30, Folder 7, RSC-IHS; J.R. 
Durham, Southern Hosiery Manufacturers’ Association, “Extension of Rubber Freezing Order,” April 29, 
1942, Box 30, Folder 7, RSC-IHS. 
 Real Silk was perpetually late 
with its shipments of M-40 parachutes, which in turn held up production for McInerney’s 
196 Truman Committee Hearing, 12877-12878. 
197 Real Silk’s line of luxury items, including lingerie and custom-made shirts, were not 
considered “essential” to preserving civilian life. In a survey conducted by the Indiana War History 
Commission, the company reported that it reduced or discontinued production of men’s underwear and 
pajamas, lingerie, and women’s silk and nylon hosiery. See “Real Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc.,” Indiana War 
History Commission Report, p. 1, Box 76, Folder “Economic Changes—Manufacturing, Real Silk Hosiery 
Mills,” IWHC-ISA. 
198 Fragmentation bombs were used primarily in the Pacific Theater, and at one point, allied 
command praised the bombs for their effectiveness in a decisive battle against Japanese soldiers in New 
Guinea. Real Silk highlighted this commendation in its company newsletter. See “Production Flash 
Bulletin: How Our M-40 Chutes Helped Win Battles in Australia!,” September 9, 1943, Box 29, Folder 9, 
RSC-IHS. 
63 
workers who could not finish assembling M-40 fragmentation bombs without the 
component parts supplied by Real Silk.199
Real Silk had been preparing for the contract for some time prior to beginning M-
40 production. The company built up an experienced workforce by taking on contracts 
which it knew would lose money, just to ensure that it could have the workers on hand 
for M-40 work.
 Many separate problems plagued this contract, 
but Real Silk’s woes began with late shipments of cloth from McInerney, which had 
received raw materials late from other suppliers. The delay of raw materials forced 
McInerney to suspend the primary contract and all subcontracts. 
200 However, when the contract was suspended, Real Silk had to lay off 
many of these workers. By the time the contract resumed, the labor market had changed. 
Although McInerney insisted that Real Silk deliver 30,000 parachutes per month, the 
factory could not produce this amount without more workers who had relevant 
experience and additional machines.201
• Additional expense because of failure of supplier to deliver 
couplings to meet production on schedule. 
 Real Silk applied to the government for 
compensation of losses caused by production delays on this contract. The company’s 
application provides excellent insight into the shortages and other delays in contracts that 
negatively affected the factory’s production. In the application, Real Silk argued that it 
should be reimbursed for the following expenses: 
• Idle plant expense incurred by Real Silk during the time 
that production was suspended (8/22/42-9/5/42). 
• Costs of telegrams to employees, advising them of 
suspension of contract, and of resumption of contract. 
                                                          
199 E.L. Jacobitz to Real Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc., October 28, 1942, Box 29, Folder 11, RSC-IHS; 
E.L. Jacobitz to O.P. Larson, “Postal Telegraph,” October 13, 1942, copy, Box 29, Folder 5, RSC-IHS; 
Joseph Givner to O.P. Larson, December 30, 1942, Box 29, Folder 5, RSC-IHS. 
200 J.C. Troyer to G.A. Efroymson, December 19, 1942, p. 2, Box 29, Folder 1, RSC-IHS. 
201 J.C. Troyer to G.A. Efroymson, December 19, 1942, p. 1-2, Box 29, Folder 1, RSC-IHS. 
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• Cost of taking a physical inventory at the time production 
on the contract was suspended. 
• Expense of interviewer calling on operators who did not 
return to work when they were notified of resumption of contract. 
• Expense incurred in training new people to take the place 
of the 132 operators who did not report back to work when production 
was resumed. 
• Increase in costs due to lengthening of working hours per 
shift, resulting in additional overtime charges not included in the 
original bid. 
• Additional expense incurred because of repairs, made at the 
insistence of the Government, and which were later determined to be 
unnecessary. 
• Additional expense incurred due to holiday and Sunday 
work. 
• Extra expense of knot tying due to change in size of shroud 
cords.202
 
 
Overall, the company estimated that the temporary closedown cost the factory 
approximately $158,000.203
In mid-October 1943, the government also began regulating the amount of nylon 
and rayon that could be used per parachute and allocating these materials accordingly. 
Such restrictions left little room for error in production and Real Silk had to be especially 
careful not to use more than its allotted amount of fabric, as any nylon or rayon used 
above and beyond the specified amount had to be paid for out of the company’s 
pocket.
 
204 At a meeting of the Industry Integration Committee,205
                                                          
202 “Additional Costs Incurred by Real Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc., because of the suspension of the 
M-40 contract, which was not the fault of Real Silk, and for which Real Silk requests reimbursement,” 
January 25, 1943, p. 1, Box 29, Folder 9, RSC-IHS; Untitled document which begins “Idle Plant Incurred 
by Real Silk…,” n.d., Box 29, Folder 9, RSC-IHS. 
 a representative of the 
Ordnance Department reported that there was a shortage of rayon, and he recommended 
203 Untitled document which begins “Idle Plant Incurred by Real Silk…,” n.d., Box 29, Folder 9, 
RSC-IHS. 
204A.A. Zimmer to G.H. Morgan, “Subject: Eighth Meeting Industry Integration Committee,” 
October 18, 1943, Box 30, Folder 8, RSC-IHS. 
205 Various war industries were encouraged to form Industry Integration Committees to benefit 
from each others’ experience with war work and to correct inefficiencies within the industry’s war 
production. “Ordnance Procurement Instructions: Part 56—Ordnance Department Industry Integration 
Committees,” December 1, 1942, pp. 56,003-56, 004 and 56A1, Box 29, Folder 13, RSC-IHS. 
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that no textile companies produce beyond their schedule, as the government had only 
enough supplies to meet current contract schedules. However, those who had worked 
ahead were bound to be idle for some time. Arthur Zimmer, a Real Silk representative 
who attended the meeting, criticized the Ordnance Department for placing orders with 
new manufacturers when it could barely guarantee the necessary materials to existing 
contracts held by companies like Real Silk.206
In another contract, for M-72 parachutes assigned to Real Silk’s Dalton, Georgia, 
plant, Real Silk suffered losses due to a government error in estimating the amount of 
nylon that DuPont, a nylon thread manufacturer, would need to produce to fill orders of 
nylon. The WPB did not make provisions for the 200-300 lbs. of nylon required to load 
the factory’s spinning equipment, and DuPont came up short on filling its orders until it 
could obtain an additional allotment of nylon. DuPont also received more orders than it 
could cover with the materials allocated to the company. To remedy the error, an order 
for more nylon had to slog its way through several channels of bureaucratic red tape. 
DuPont had to file a request for more nylon with the Ordnance Department, who in turn 
had to clear the additional nylon allocation with the WPB.
 
207 As Real Silk awaited nylon 
materials, the Dalton plant stopped work on the M-72 contract and the managers were 
forced to take $3,000 from the overhead budget to pay the factory’s idle workers.208
Acute shortages of raw materials also curtailed Real Silk’s ability to bid on more 
lucrative contracts. For example, Real Silk was not allowed to use raw silk to create 
 
                                                          
206 A.A. Zimmer to G.A. Efroymson, “Subject: Eighth Meeting Industry Integration Committee,” 
October 18, 1943, Box 30, Folder 8, RSC-IHS; O.P. Larson and A.A. Zimmer to G.A. Efroymson and 
Joseph Givner, “Report of Integration Committee Meeting,” June 12, 1943, Box 29, Folder 12, RSC-IHS. 
207 O.P. Larson and A.A. Zimmer to G.A. Efroymson and Joseph Givner, “Report of Integration 
Committee Meeting,” June 12, 1943, Box 29, Folder 12, RSC-IHS. 
208 R.W. Buhl to O.P. Larson, May 11, 1943, Box 29, Folder 12, RSC-IHS; O.P. Larson and A.A. 
Zimmer to G.A. Efroymson and Joseph Givner, “Report of Integration Committee Meeting,” June 12, 
1943, Box 29, Folder 12, RSC-IHS. 
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sample parachutes and other war products to send to contractors as examples during a 
bid. Instead, they had to rely on rejected, or substandard, silk from another 
manufacturer.209
The scarcity of machine tools also negatively affected Real Silk’s production 
schedules. Metals, as well as factories capable of producing new machine tools were 
scarce, and the ANMB’s pre-war planning for machine tool shortages was decidedly 
insufficient. Despite estimates that industry demand for machine tools would triple in 
1942, available machine tools actually decreased at the end of 1941. Although machine 
tool production increased six fold by the end of 1942, supply never met astronomical 
demands and shortages existed throughout most of the war.
 This regulation limited their competitiveness in the bidding process. Nor 
could the company always make test samples to help them plan their production set-up, 
another departure from the company’s standard procedures. 
210 Both shortages and 
bureaucratic red tape made it nearly impossible for Real Silk to obtain new machines for 
its war production department.  In a letter to WPB director, Donald M. Nelson, Real 
Silk’s Vice President, Joseph Givner, expressed the company’s frustration at being given 
the run-around by WPB and the Air Force, both of which failed to give Real Silk the 
priority necessary to obtain 30 new machines needed to finish a contract. He wrote, 
“…what does a fellow have to do to get these vital machines in order to get the job 
done—on time—and profitably?”211
                                                          
209 F.B. Riechmann to G.A. Efroymson, November 17, 1941, Box 29, Folder 1, RSC-IHS. 
 Materials to repair machines were also difficult to 
obtain. By October 1942, the textile industry was operating at double the 1940 rate, yet it 
210 Koistinen, Arsenal of World War II, 117-118. 
211 Joseph Givner to Donald M. Nelson, March 3, 1943, Box 29, Folder 10, RSC-IHS. 
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received only 11.8 percent of the steel that it consumed in 1940 for maintenance and 
repair, and what machine parts it did receive were delivered irregularly.212
After Real Silk obtained the raw materials necessary for its war contracts, more 
complications awaited the factory in the actual manufacturing process. In its prewar 
production, Real Silk was accustomed to controlling the purchase of raw materials 
(especially silk), designing its own products, engineering the manufacturing process, and 
conducting its own inspections of finished goods. The company had its own designer, 
Francis Gadis, and a design department dedicated to developing most of the products that 
the company distributed. In-house industrial engineers would then develop a method for 
mass-producing these designs in the factory. With war contracts, however, Real Silk had 
little to no control over the design of the products to be manufactured. Usually, the 
contractor sent out drawings of the items to be made to various bidders. Factories then 
made a sample of the product based on the drawing and sent both the sample and an 
estimated cost per piece to the contractor.
 
213
Unfortunately, war contractors often changed the specifications or size of the 
order mid-contract, and each modification interrupted the manufacturing process and 
made controlling the price per piece more difficult. According to the Ordnance 
Department’s ‘Ordnance Procurement Instructions,’ “The contracting officer may at any 
time, by a written order, and without notice to the sureties, make changes in the drawings 
 If Real Silk offered the lowest bid and the 
sample was satisfactory, the contractor would offer the job to Real Silk. The product 
dimensions, construction, and material specifications were set in advance and a 
manufacturer could only guarantee the price if the specifications remained consistent. 
                                                          
212 Meeting XXXV: October 13, 1942, “Feasibility of the War Production Program,” WPB 
Minutes, 144; Truman Committee Hearing, 12878. 
213 George H. Morgan to “Co-Worker,” September 20, 1943, Box 30, Folder 9, RSC-IHS. 
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or specifications. Changes as to shipment and packing of all supplies may also be made 
as above provided.”214
Sudden changes in design wreaked havoc on Real Silk’s production process.
 Essentially, government and military contractors could stop a 
contract at any point and change product and shipping specifications without any 
advanced notice. 
215 
Changing specifications meant that production had to be stopped while the assembly line 
was modified. Further delays resulted as the factory waited to obtain new material, or 
spent time altering completed products to meet the new design specifications.216 In 1942 
alone, 7 out of 26 (over 25 percent) of the contracts Real Silk accepted experienced 
changes in order size or design specifications.217 Real Silk’s subcontract with McInerney 
Spring &Wire Co. for M-40 parachutes provides a clear example of how deviations from 
the original design and construction materials introduced problems into the planned 
manufacturing process. The company’s war contracts representative complained that 
“There was continual changes coming through on this [contract] and there has been no 
end of difficulties encountered with this contract.”218
                                                          
214 “Ordnance Procurement Instructions: Part 56—Ordnance Department Industry Integration 
Committees,” December 1, 1942, p. 56,008, Box 29, Folder 13, RSC-IHS. 
 First, the shroud cords issued for 
the contract were changed to rayon from the original material with which Real Silk 
experimented when bidding on the contract. The rayon cords were thicker than the 
215 In a 1943 survey for the Smaller War Plants Corporation, Real Silk identified “changes in 
specification” as one of two reasons why the company was running behind on scheduled delivery dates for 
war contracts. The other reason was labor supply, which will be discussed further in Chapter 4. United 
States of America Smaller War Plants Corporation, “Report of Shipments, Orders and Other Data,” May 8, 
1942, p. 1, Box 30, Folder 9, RSC-IHS. 
216 The Michigan automobile industry experienced similar problems with relentless changes in war 
product design and abrupt transitions from production of one product to another. Despite the automobile 
industry’s extensive experience with changing automobile models annually, the extreme speed with which 
the industry had to modify designs and switch production to new items in wartime caused problems for 
even this high-priority industry. Clive, State of War, 30. 
217 “War Contracts,” Inter-Organization Correspondence, October 28, 1942, p. 2, Box 29, Folder 
1, RSC-IHS; “Inter-Organization Correspondence,” October 30, 1942, n.p., Box 29, Folder 1, RSC-IHS. 
218 “Inter-Organization Correspondence,” October 28, 1942, p. 2, Box 29, Folder 1, RSC-IHS. 
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original variety and extra steps had to be added to the manufacturing process to connect 
the cords to couplings designed for a thinner cord. This, in turn, increased the man-hours 
and cost-per-item. Second, the contractor provided Real Silk with a different type of 
fabric than called for in the design, so extra stitching had to be applied to each piece to 
prevent the material from running. Thus extra man-hours were logged for each item.219
In some cases, changes in specifications also meant the return and repair of many 
finished goods that the factory had already shipped. For example, in one M-26 parachute 
contract, the government approved a new method for attaching shroud lines to the 
parachutes mid-contract. A load of M-26 parachutes already assembled and shipped by 
Real Silk using the old method were returned for repairs. Faced with the possibility of 
having to shoulder the expense of repairing the parachutes, industrial engineer A.A. 
Zimmer argued in a memo that the company should not be held financially responsible 
for parachutes made correctly under the old specifications.
 
220
At other times, rejected items were the result of what Real Silk’s management 
deemed the impossible standards of government product inspections. For example, most 
experienced employees were used to working with one or two needle machines, but 
parachutes required the use of four-needle machines. Real Silk considered it satisfactory 
for three of the four threads to catch the fabric, but government testers at Wright Field for 
one of the parachute contracts considered this unacceptable.
 
221 This parachute contract 
demonstrates the variation between the government and the factory standards.222
                                                          
219 “Inter-Organization Correspondence,” October 28, 1942, pp.1-2, Box 29, Folder 1, RSC-IHS. 
 
220 A.A. Zimmer to G.E. Burke, “Subject: Repairing Returned M-26 Sleeves,” November 13, 
1942, Box 30, Folder 8, RSC-IHS. 
221 “Conference between Representative of Real Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc., and American Federation 
of Hosiery Workers,” February 4, 1943, pp. 56-57, Box 9, Folder 12, RSC-IHS. 
222 A side-by-side comparison of the Government’s inspection report on Real Silk’s sample 2-S1 
human parachute and the company’s responses to the inspection points provide further examples of the 
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Throughout the war, different government contractors sent their own inspectors to 
factories across the nation to inspect products. One Army Air Force (AAF) inspector, 
referred to as “Mr. Griffin,” was particularly troublesome to Real Silk. In March 1943, 
the Army Air Force Inspection Section demoted Real Silk’s factory to a Class D rating on 
quality control, which constituted a non-approval rating. However, Joseph Givner 
asserted that the sub-standard quality was more due to the lack of quality specifications or 
standards from the Ordnance Department than the company’s Inspection Department. 
Since Ordnance Department inspector Griffin did not provide consistent standards, Real 
Silk’s in-house inspectors did not know what to look for. In addition, Real Silk 
employees accused Mr. Griffin of being “tempermental [sic], when anyone fails to agree 
with his way of thinking, he starts to penalize the company and United States 
Government by rejecting chutes for things that he had been approving the previous 
day.”223 Rejections of finished products happened so frequently, Joseph Givner 
complained that employees spent as much time fixing rejected chutes and waiting for 
broken machines to be repaired as they did in making new goods.224
Real Silk did not always falter under the pressure of sudden changes in war 
contract orders, however. On several occasions, the Philadelphia Quartermaster Corps 
contracted with Real Silk to produce mosquito bars, but abruptly requested that the 
factory stop production and switch to making sandfly bars out of the material supplied. In 
one rush order, Real Silk made 6,000 sandfly bars in five days. Each time the company 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
disconnect between Government inspection standards and those of the company. A.A. Zimmer to G.A. 
Efroymson, October 12, 1942, Box 29, Folder 10, RSC-IHS. 
223 Joseph Givner to Louis B. Vanderhorst, “Subject: Quality Control,” April 30 1943, Box 29, 
Folder 16, RSC-IHS;  A.A. Zimmer to J. Givner, “Re: Meeting Tuesday with Mr. Nicholas, Lt. Nutter, and 
Mr. Vanderhorst,” March 8, 1943, Box 29, Folder 16, RSC-IHS. 
224 “Conference between Representative of Real Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc., and American Federation 
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met the demanding deadlines, it received written commendations from the Quartermaster 
for doing such a good job on short notice.225
But more often, contract or design alterations were too monumental to avoid 
increased costs or delayed deliveries. For example, on another contract for sandfly bars, 
Real Silk’s workers managed to produce twice as many bars as the company predicted in 
their bid to the Quartermaster. However, the company still lost money. And when the 
government requested that the company return to making mosquito bars again, the 
company lost more money in the transition.
 
226 Unnecessarily high product standards, 
inconsistent inspections methods, and frequent changes in contract specifications resulted 
in production bottlenecks and an incredible waste of money on war contracts. In fact, the 
WPB estimated that changes in war material designs or specifications were responsible 
for over ninety-percent of cost overages on war contracts.227
Real Silk was also at the mercy of individual war contractors when it came to 
alterations in contract size and sudden cancellations. One of the greatest challenges the 
U.S. war mobilization program faced was trying to accurately predict supply needs for 
the Armed Forces. As circumstances on the battlefield changed, requirements also 
changed. Changes in military supply needs often trickled down to individual 
manufacturers in the form of contract reductions and cancellations.
 
228
In one sub-contract with the Bunswick-Balke Collender Co. of Muskegon, 
Michigan, an order for 110,000 M-26 sleeves was cut in half, leaving Real Silk with only 
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55,000 sleeves to produce. The contract was changed again later on, which cut the order 
to 30,272 sleeves and reduced the value of the contract from $77,000.00 to $46,316.16. 
The Ordnance Department ordered too many flares and asked prime contractors to cut 
down the number of flares they made, and the reduced order passed on to the 
subcontractors like Real Silk as well. O.P. Larson reported that the change in contract 
order and specifications “caused a great deal of paper work, cancelling orders for 
materials and supplies due to this mandatory change.”229
The military procurement agencies also reserved the right to cancel contracts.
 Each time a procurement 
agency cut an order, the total value of the contract decreased, leaving Real Silk with less 
profit. 
230 
For example, in a parachute contract with Real Silk, the Army Air Corps included a 
provision allowing them to cancel the contract at any time.  In this case, Real Silk would 
be reimbursed for the portion of the contract completed at the time of termination, as well 
as the expense for all supplies purchased for the uncompleted portion of the contract. In 
addition the government would pay a profit to Real Silk for the uncompleted portion by 
estimating the profit that would have been made on the uncompleted portion of the 
contract and multiplying it by the percentage already completed.231
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termination, because production rates were at their lowest when a factory retooled and 
modified for new contracts. The production rate increased and the costs were reduced 
further into the contract, as new employees settled into the production rhythm and 
engineers perfected the production process for the new item.232
When the war products were finally finished and approved by the in-house and 
government inspectors, they awaited transportation from the factory to military 
destinations. In the pre-war economy, Real Silk had a great deal of control over the 
transport and distribution of its finished goods. As one of the largest direct-sellers of 
hosiery, Real Silk had a national network of district offices that oversaw the sale and 
distribution of the company’s products. The mill relied heavily on transportation by 
itinerant or “gypsy” trucks.
 
233
President Roosevelt created the Office of Defense Transportation by Executive 
Order on December 18, 1941. This wartime agency was responsible for ensuring the 
maximum utilization of the nation’s domestic transportation facilities and managing 
transportation properties seized by the government during the war.
 However, during the war, much of the company’s 
transportation autonomy disappeared when a new government organization, the Office of 
Defense Transportation (ODT), began directing the national transportation system. 
234
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 ODT’s oversight 
encompassed railroads, motor vehicles, pipelines, air transport, inland waterway and 
coastal and intercoastal traffic, and all other domestic transportation services. The agency 
also represented transportation concerns at the meetings of other government agencies. 
233 Real Silk received several notices of legislation backed by railroad interests that targeted truck 
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ODT focused heavily on maximizing the efficiency of the railroad systems. In 1940, 
locomotives carried 61 percent of the nation’s freight. By 1943 this percentage had 
increased to 72 percent. Unlike WWI, when the government seized control of the 
railroads and other forms of transportation, ODT relied on voluntary cooperation from 
industry executives and associations, producing better results in WWII.235
The ODT often clashed with WPB over allocation of resources and a debate over 
whether or not to institute a priorities system for defense transportation. While WPB 
permitted an adequate number of locomotive engines to be produced, the agency did not 
allow for the production of an adequate number of passenger and freight cars. Instead, 
ODT had to maximize use of existing railroad car capacity, putting greater stress on the 
existing railroad system. Steel and other repair materials were also scarce and the War 
Production Board supplied only a fraction of the material necessary for the upkeep of the 
railroad system. The Director of Defense Transportation issued public statements 
implying that if the railroads did not meet wartime requirements, the WPB’s inadequate 
supply of materials to the railroad program were to blame.
 
236
ODT had little success in managing waterborne traffic and motor vehicles, and 
neither of these transportation modes removed much burden from the railroads. 
Voluntary methods did not work as well for the millions of trucks, buses, and other motor 
vehicles scattered in decentralized systems throughout the nation. Eventually, ODT 
passed the responsibility for their regulation to the Office of Price Administration which 
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oversaw the rationing of vehicles, tires, and gasoline.237 Critical shortages of rubber 
limited the number of new domestic vehicles that could be produced and restricted 
repairs on existing vehicles. Overseas transportation needs also diverted a great deal of 
ships used for domestic waterborne commerce to ocean transportation.238
Throughout the war, the defense transportation system became increasingly 
congested. Beginning in May 1942, the Office of Defense Transportation required that 
Real Silk and 2,300 other industries send in reports tracking the amount of traffic leaving 
their factories to transport finished goods. This measure was intended to document 
regional transportation use and help the ODT to coordinate war industries’ needs for 
railroad and automotive transportation of war supplies.
 
239 For Real Silk, delayed 
transportation of goods and raw materials meant another clog in its production machine. 
In a memo to Efroymson, Joseph Givner expressed concern about the delayed removal of 
finished goods from Real Silk’s warehouses. The company’s storage spaces filled to the 
brim as it awaited government freight cars to remove the goods and ship them overseas. 
With no further storage space for finished goods, factory workers could not begin on the 
next contract. There was nowhere to put the new textiles rolling off the assembly line.240
An even greater problem was the payment delay that the bogged down 
transportation system caused. According to Efroymson’s memo, Real Silk did not receive 
payment until the war materials actually shipped, forcing the company to shoulder 
production costs until a government check arrived. With no place to store newly 
produced items and no money to pay the workers, Real Silk had to lay off many workers 
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between contracts, impeding the company’s ability to retain a trained labor force. The 
transportation problem is just one example of how the U.S. industrial mobilization 
program was plagued with chain reaction hindrances. In just this one case, inefficiencies 
in wartime transportation caused storage, financial, and labor problems for Real Silk.241
Despite the many obstacles the company faced in 1942 and early 1943, it did 
eventually begin to adapt to wartime demands. Company reports in 1943 revealed that the 
majority of the war contracts in progress near the end of 1943 were on schedule.
 
242 Also, 
the company’s net profit rose to $700,285.46 in 1943 from the miniscule 1942 profit of 
$76,208.68. Unfortunately, Real Silk’s records on war contracts only cover 1942-1943. 
Annual reports for 1944 and 1945 provide the only insight, though limited, into how the 
company fared throughout the rest of the war. Although the factory’s sales and operating 
profit rose each year from 1944-1945, the net profit dropped below the prewar 1941 level 
of over $500,000. Net profit amounted to $479,546.54 in 1944 and $408,791.21 in 1945. 
Just as the factory started to adapt to war production and began making reasonable 
financial gains at the end of 1943, federal excess profits tax on war goods cancelled much 
of these financial gains.243
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company profits and in 1945 it removed $475,000 in profits.244 Ultimately, the 
company’s profits peaked briefly in 1943, but declined throughout the rest of the war.245
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Chapter 4 
Labor Problems 
In January 1943, the War Production Board (WPB) identified four major 
bottlenecks that inhibited the industrial war machine: critical raw materials, food 
products, transportation, and labor supply.248 Two of these bottlenecks—critical raw 
materials and transportation—were discussed in the previous chapter. This chapter will 
focus on the last bottleneck—labor supply—which quickly developed into the most 
pressing issue in the national mobilization program and remained so until the end of the 
war. Unique circumstances presented by the war completely reshaped the labor market, 
affecting the quantity, quality, and composition of the workforce. The Armed Services 
pulled men from the American workforce at the same time that the nation required more 
industrial workers than ever before to meet production demands. In March 1942, the 
WPB estimated that “between the end of 1940 and the end of 1942 the number of defense 
workers will [have] increased by 15.8 million and the armed forces by 3.4 million.”249
By May 1941, the supply of skilled labor essential to industry was nearly 
exhausted filling war supply orders both at home and abroad in such programs as Lend-
 As 
the Armed Services, industry, agriculture, and government competed for manpower, the 
labor supply began to run dry. 
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Lease.250 Employers looked to untapped sources of labor and recruited women and 
African American workers more heavily.251 More importantly, the average skill level of 
the workforce decreased as skilled male workers left for war. Industries had to lower their 
employment standards and invest more time and energy into training workers. Unlike the 
Depression Era, when skilled workers were forced to take jobs wherever they could find 
them, the wartime labor market favored the individual worker who could have his or her 
pick of available jobs in the midst of crushing labor shortages.252 Both labor shortages 
and changes in the composition of the local labor market affected Real Silk’s business 
operations during the war, and limited the ability of the company to remain profitable and 
meet production demands.253
As manpower mobilization grew more complex, President Roosevelt created the 
War Manpower Commission (WMC) by executive order on April 18, 1942, “to assure 
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the most effective mobilization and utilization of the nation’s manpower for war.”254 
Roosevelt placed former Indiana governor Paul V. McNutt at its head. Unlike materials 
and products, human resources could not be managed through strict priority and 
allocation systems, so the WMC chairman relied heavily on localism and voluntarism to 
solve the manpower crisis.255 Although the Manpower Priorities Committee of the WMC 
attempted to prioritize labor resources according to greatest need per industry, workers 
could not be forced to accept a particular job or switch to a higher priority position. 
Individuals sought employment at businesses with the highest wages and the best 
working conditions.256
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Committee would still grant the priority requested.”257 A National Service Act (labor 
draft) was considered throughout the war, but it never became law.258
While the entire nation suffered from labor shortages, the nature of these 
shortages and the labor market were distinctive for each geographical area. As such, 
McNutt recognized that manpower resources would be best managed by local agencies 
and organizations.
 
259 To support his localistic approach to manpower mobilization, 
McNutt enlisted the aid of the United States Employment Service (USES). The USES 
had an established network of employment offices throughout the nation and could 
supply the WMC with information on local labor situations and offer its existing 
employment placement services to aid manpower mobilization.260 On September 17, 
1942, the WMC assumed control of the USES and added the organization’s networks and 
services to its resources.261
The WMC divided the nation into service regions overseen by regional branches 
of the organization. Indiana was a part of Region VI, which encompassed Indiana, 
Illinois, and Wisconsin with a regional office in Chicago until the WMC opened a branch 
office in Indianapolis in 1943.
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The Indiana labor market experienced severe shortages and “by the fall of 1943, 
the normal labor market throughout Indiana had been practically exhausted.”263 In fact, of 
the 2,455 businesses in the state that ceased operation from 1940 to 1942, 1,111 were 
forced to terminate because they had fewer employees than required to stay open, making 
this the number one reason for business termination in the early years of the war.264 The 
most severe and widespread shortages existed from the fall of 1943 to mid-1945.265 
Indianapolis’s own shortages throughout this period were classified as “serious” to 
“critical,” the second and first most severe categories, respectively.266
To help alleviate the shortage of skilled labor and other labor problems that 
emerged, area offices of the Indiana WMC adopted a statewide Employment Stabilization 
Plan on October 14, 1943. Employment Stabilization Programs were instituted by the 
WMC in the most problematic labor areas throughout the nation.
 
267
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a. the elimination of the wasteful labor turnover in essential activities,  
b. the reduction of unnecessary labor migration,  
c. the direction of the flow of scarce labor where most needed in the war 
program,  
d. the maximum utilization of manpower resources,  
e. the establishment of procedures for the orderly transfer of essential 
workers. 
 
Measures of the plan included the establishment of a 48-hour work week, a 
priority urgency rating program, a priority referral program, and the regulation of 
employee transfers from one business to another.268 However, a 1946 report on the 
Indiana WMC observed that the Employment Stabilization Program was entirely 
voluntary and “due to a lack of enforceable sanctions or any sort of penalty for violation, 
lost a certain amount of effectiveness.”269
In order to guide local labor programs, the Indiana Employment Security Division 
(ESD), an employee placement service, collected statistical data on local labor markets 
throughout the state. The division chose a select number of businesses in each labor area 
as subjects for study, and gathered statistics on labor turnover rates, numbers of female 
and African American employees, labor migration, and anticipated local labor supply, 
among other data. Real Silk was included in the ESD’s study of the Indianapolis Labor 
Market Area and the statistical data about the company in these reports, combined with 
the company’s own records, shed light on the textile manufacturer’s struggles to remain 
competitive in a tumultuous labor market.
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Like many other industries in the U.S., the textile industry experienced severe 
labor shortages. In fact, later in the war, the WPB identified the textile industry as among 
the most difficult for which to recruit “able-bodied male workers.” 271 Also, between VE 
and VJ day in 1945, labor shortages would persist in textile plants (as well as foundries, 
logging and lumbering, food processing plants, and railroad track labor) despite the fact 
that the nation was switching to a one-front war and many industries were facing fewer 
shortages.272 The labor shortage was reflected on a more local level when power sewing 
machine operators, an essential type of textile employee, ranked among the top five 
critical labor shortages in a list compiled in the Indianapolis Labor Market Reports for 
July and September 1943.273 In fact, the silk and rayon goods industries, as well as the 
hosiery industry, were among the few industries in which the labor force contracted 
rather than expanded during the war. Nationwide employment of workers in silk and 
rayon goods manufacturing dropped from 108,000 workers in 1941 to 97,800 in 1943. 
Overall employment in the hosiery industry dropped from 150,000 in 1941 to 123,000 in 
1943.274 According to a 1943 Textile Workers Union of America report, curtailment of 
certain civilian items and shortages of raw materials essential to the textile industry were 
largely responsible for the decrease in employees.275
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Real Silk began hiring for its new War Contracts Department in February 1942. 
The department started out with approximately a dozen employees, but quickly 
expanded. In May 1942, the department consisted of 263 employees and by December 
this number had grown to 1,336, reversing the workforce reductions caused by “priorities 
unemployment” in 1941.276 The peak employment in Real Silk’s War Contracts 
Department occurred in March 1943, when the department included 1,503 members, 
approximately half of the company’s entire Indianapolis workforce. Initial hiring for the 
department quickly exhausted the supply of experienced power sewing machine operators 
and power sewing machine mechanics in the Indianapolis area. The company then 
applied to the USES to search for additional sources of employees statewide and in 
adjoining states.277
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As the nation geared up for war, Real Silk not only lost skilled male workers to 
the military, but many of its experienced female workers as well. The company 
newsletter, Real News, contains several features on women employees who left to join 
the Women’s Army Corps (WAC), Army Air Forces School of Applied Tactics 
(AAFSAT), Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service (WAVES, Navy), and 
Nurse’s Corps.278
Eventually, Real Silk had to seek untapped sources of labor for recruitment. 
Traditionally, the textile industry employed a large number of women,
 
279 so the influx of 
women into the labor market did not catch Real Silk off guard, as it did many other 
businesses.280
                                                          
278 Competition between industry and the military for manpower was a nationwide problem. For 
example, in the fall of 1943, an advertising campaign from Women’s Army Corps (WAC) presented 
serious competition to WMC recruitment of women to industry and divided recruitment efforts. Byron 
Fairchild and Jonathan Grossman, United States Army in World War II: The Army and Industrial 
Manpower (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959), 171-172. For articles on Real 
Silk’s women workers in the military see Real Silk Hosiery Mills, “We’re Proud of Her,” The Real News 2, 
no. 1 (January 1, 1944): 2, Indiana Book Collection, Indiana State Library (hereafter cited as IBC-ISL); 
“Georgia Peach,” Real News 2, no. 5 (May 1, 1944): 1, IBC-ISL; “Lingerie’s WAC,” Real News 2, no. 6 
(June 1, 1944): 8, IBC-ISL; “Is it Still Wonderful Linda,” Real News 3, no. 2 (February 1, 1945): 1, IBC-
ISL; “Seamer Cadet Nurse,” Real News 3, no. 7 (July 1, 1945): 1, IBC-ISL. 
 Before the war, women comprised a little over half of the factory’s 
279 Nancy Gabin pointed out that 20 percent of the 11 million women employed in 1940 worked in 
manufacturing. Of these 20 percent, a large number were concentrated in low-paid industries including 
“textiles and garments.” She also indicated that women comprised the dominant labor force in the textile 
and garment industry before and after the war, even after the industry’s shift to defense contracts. Gabin, 
“Women Defense Workers in World War II,” 107, 110. 
280 Nationwide, the number of women workers rose from approximately 10,800,000 in 1940 to 
19,000,000 at its peak in 1944-1945. According to Gabin, Indiana had an especially large influx of female 
workers to industry in WWII. Gabin stated that “[i]n 1940, women represented 18 percent of those 
employed in manufacturing in the state. By the end of 1943, more than one-third of all factory workers in 
Indiana were women.” In previously male-dominated industries such as iron and steel mills, the number of 
female employees increased as much as 260 percent by 1944. The sudden increase in female employees 
required factories to adjust their facilities and assembly line tasks to accommodate women’s needs. For 
example, traditionally male-dominated industries did not have adequate rest-rooms and other service 
facilities for women. Tools and assembly-line configurations were also more commonly designed for men 
and needed to be adjusted to accommodate the height and lifting capacity of women. While Real Silk did 
have to make some adjustments in factory setups to accommodate women filling positions once held by 
male employees, the factory accommodated large numbers of women workers both in service facilities and 
assembly line configurations before the war. Flynn, The Mess in Washington, 172, 177; Gabin, “Women 
Defense Workers,” 108; Chester W. Gregory, Women in Defense Work During World War II: An Analysis 
of the Labor Problem and Women’s Rights (New York: Exposition Press, 1974), 51-66. 
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workforce.281 In fact, the ESD’s report on Real Silk emphasized that the textile 
manufacturer was “considered about the best spot in the city for women workers.”282 
However, the total number of women in the factory did rise considerably to 
approximately eighty percent during the war, while other companies’ numbers remained 
well below this mark.283 For example, in a survey of trends in employment of women in 
Indianapolis for November 1943, Electronic Laboratories, R.C.A. Victor Division, and 
P.R. Mallory Company came closest to matching Real Silk’s large female workforce with 
75.1 percent, 54.3 percent, and 53.9 percent female employees, respectively. Depending 
on the industry, most of the remaining companies cited in the Indianapolis Labor Market 
Survey contained a workforce comprised of fewer than 40 percent female employees.284 
Despite the reluctance of many businesses to hire African American workers, even during 
extreme labor shortages, Real Silk actively recruited workers from this segment of the 
labor market through advertisements in the city’s African American newspaper, the 
Indianapolis Recorder.285
Once the supply of skilled workers ran dry, the company looked to other sources 
of labor, especially among individuals who had never held a factory position. The USES 
encouraged factories to “reduce job specifications” and “[lower] hiring standards” to tap 
 
                                                          
281 “Employee Statistics as of Sept. 19, 1940,” n.d., Box 9, Folder 10, RSC-IHS. 
282 Employment Security Division “Real Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc.,” Report of the Indianapolis Area 
Director War Manpower Commission, Labor Market Analysis, 1941-1943, Appendix, p. x-6, Box 38, ISA.  
283 See Indianapolis Labor Market Reports in Employment Security Division, Report of Labor 
Market Developments, Indianapolis, 1941-1946, 3 vols., Box 38-40, ISA. 
284 Employment Security Division, “Table E-4. Recent Trends in the Ratio of Number of Women 
Employed to Total Employment in Selected Industries and Establishments,” Labor Market Developments 
Report for Indianapolis, IN, December 1943, p. 30, Box 38, ISA. 
285 An advertisement in the African-American newspaper, the Indianapolis Recorder, called for 
women 20-50 years old to work on sewing projects at Real Silk. The company’s advertisement indicates 
that the company was interested in both white and “colored” employees. “Real Silk to Pay Trainees for 
Factory Work Here,” Indianapolis Recorder, July 25, 1942, p. 1, accessed IUPUI Digital Scholarship. For 
more on discrimination against African American workers in WWII, see Flynn, The Mess in Washington, 
Chapter 7 and Bynum, A. Philip Randolph, Chapter 9. 
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into unused sources of unskilled labor. To accommodate these less skilled workers, 
employers were encouraged to break down complex jobs into simpler tasks.286
The average skill level among Real Silk employees significantly decreased, and 
many of the company’s remaining experienced foremen and managers were reassigned to 
war work.
 
287 Yet even these experienced employees faced a learning curve to deal with 
unfamiliar machinery and new product lines. After skilled employees had transferred to 
war work, the company’s vice president, Joseph Givner, noted that quality and service for 
the factory’s traditional products, such as lingerie, decreased significantly.288 Overall 
efficiency in the factory decreased as well, especially in the War Contracts Department. 
For example, for the fiscal year 1939-1940, just before U.S. entry into WWII, the 
company enjoyed an error rate of less than 3 percent on the finished products it 
shipped.289
                                                          
286 U.S. War Manpower Commission, Indiana, The War Manpower Commission in Indiana, 1943-
1945, May 1946, p. 3, IPC- ISL. 
 However, concerns about employee efficiency and speed are apparent in 
company documents from 1942-1943. One 1943 status report on several war contracts 
287 According to a 1943 Indiana Employment Security Division report on Real Silk, the company 
hired “inexperienced women, both white and nonwhite” to train as power sewing machine operators for 
war work. The ESD predicted that “future expansion will be along similar lines.” Employment Security 
Division, “Real Silk Hosiery Mills,” Report of the Indianapolis Area Director War Manpower Commission 
Labor Market Analysis, Appendix, x-6, Box 38, ISA. 
288 Joseph Givner to Real Silk company management, August 27, 1942, Box 30, Folder 9, RSC-
IHS. 
289 Company records of product shipments for the C.O.D. Division reported a “Loss on 
Imperfects” of less than three percent for each shipment in existing 1939 and 1940 reports.“Comparative 
Statement of C.O.D. Operating Results, Real Silk Hosiery Mills, Incorporated,” in C.O.D. Division 
Operating Profit $15,113.73—Schedule B-2, Year Accumulated 1940 vs. 1939, April 1939/1940, Box 28, 
Folder 11, RSC-IHS; “Comparative Statement of C.O.D. Operating Results, Real Silk Hosiery Mills, 
Incorporated,” C.O.D. Division Operating Loss $-71,903.25—Schedule B-2, January 1939/1940, Box 28, 
Folder 11, RSC-IHS; “Comparative Statement of C.O.D Operating Results, Real Silk Hosiery Mills, 
Incorporated,” June 1939/1940, Box 28, Folder 11, RSC-IHS; “Comparative Statement of C.O.D Operating 
Results, Real Silk Hosiery Mills, Incorporated,” C.O.D. Division Operating Loss $30,864.32—Schedule B-
2, Year Accumulated 1940 vs. 1939, Box 28, Folder 12, RSC-IHS; “Comparative Statement of C.O.D. 
Operating Results, Real Silk Hosiery Mills, Incorporated,”  in C.O.D Division Operating Profit $99,242.87 
(Sch. 1B), Box 28, Folder 13, RSC-IHS; “Comparative Statement of C.O.D Operating Results, Real Silk 
Hosiery Mills, Incorporated,” C.O.D. Division Operating Loss $40,919.39—Schedule B-2, Year 
Accumulated 1940 vs. 1939, Box 28, Folder 13, RSC-IHS; “Comparative Statement of C.O.D. Operating 
Results, Budget 40A,” in C.O.D. Division, Box 28, Folder 13, RSC-IHS. 
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indicated that production was slow and behind schedule, largely due to the inexperience 
of new trainee workers.290
To improve workers’ skill levels and fill the gaps left by the departure of skilled 
workers, the factory provided extensive training for new hires, as well as in-plant training 
courses. Schools, universities, and trade schools throughout the nation offered free 
courses aimed at training workers for skilled positions in war industries as part of the 
federal Engineering Science, and Management War Training Program.
 On some war contracts, entire shipments of goods were sent 
back to the factory for repairs. 
291 One notable 
Indiana partner in the federal program was Purdue University. In a recruitment pamphlet, 
the university boasted that its instructors had trained 50,000 workers for war work in 100 
cities. The Indiana institution offered courses both on its campus and on-site at 
workplaces through partnerships with individual businesses.292
Real Silk encouraged its employees to take courses through Purdue to increase the 
numbers of skilled workers the company desperately needed. Notices in the company 
newsletter urged employees to consider taking courses in Fundamentals of Manufacturing 
Accounting, Advanced Industrial Accounting, Production Methods, Production Control, 
 
                                                          
290 For example on a contract for M-26 sleeves, slow operators, inexperienced workers, and 
trainees were among the top reasons given for slow production. In the majority of the weeks reported, many 
operators produced far less than the original standard set for them. Inefficient workers were a problem on a 
mosquito bar and M-40 parachute contract, as well, though to a lesser extent. Another report on parachute 
production for the week of January 2, 1943 demonstrated that workers on the majority of operations or 
tasks for the contract were producing below 85 percent of the efficiency necessary to stay on the production 
schedule. For one operation, efficiency was as low as 46 percent. See Weekly & Cumulative Production 
Reports for M 26 Sleeves, M-40 Chutes, and Mosquito Bars, 1942-1943, Box 29, Folders 6 and 7; Joseph 
Givner to G.M. Morgan, May 27, 1943, Box 30, Folder 9, RSC-IHS; “Comparison of Chutes per Hour as 
Required by Wage Schedule December 21, 1942 Versus Actual Week Ended January 2, 1943,” Box 29, 
Folder 9, RSC-IHS.  
291 Max Parvin Cavnes, The Hoosier Community at War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1961), 360-365; Flynn, The Mess in Washington, 58-59. 
292 Purdue University, War Training Office, Purdue War Training: Engineering, Science, 
Management, Free War Training Courses Offered by Purdue University Under the Authority of the United 
States Office of Education, [1943?], IPC-ISL.  
90 
Industrial Management, Industrial Personnel Management, and Industrial Safety.293 Real 
Silk hosted at least one on-site Purdue training course on Manufacturing Accounting.294 
However, the company maintained its own training school for power sewing machine 
operators, sewing machine mechanics, time study engineers, and fixers, and shouldered 
most of the training costs.295 Instructors were also kept on-site to train machine and hand 
operators and to help increase efficiency and quality.296
Although internal documents do not specify how much money was spent on 
employee training, company president Gustav Efroymson stated in the 1942 annual 
report: “During the past year your company expended a considerable amount for the 
training of a large number of employees for the new type of work. . . .”
 
297 Nulty & Hurst 
Mill in Reading, Pennsylvania, a similar business, reported investing an average of $150-
$200 to train each new hire.298
Despite investing a great deal of time and money in the training of wartime 
employees, high turnover rates necessitated the expenditure of more money to locate, 
 The increased wartime expense of training employees was 
unavoidable and would have been acceptable had the majority of new hires and trainees 
actually remained at the factory throughout the rest of the war. However, Real Silk 
experienced high turnover rates that transformed this once occasional training expense 
into an ongoing financial burden. 
                                                          
293 “Purdue University Extension Offers Free Training to Realsilkers,” The Real News 2, no. 2 
(February 1, 1944): 3, IBC-ISL; “Purdue Extension Offers College Credit Courses,” The Real News 2, no. 
11 (November 1, 1944): 2, IBC-ISL. 
294 “The Accounting Class,” Real News 2, no. 4 (April 1, 1944): 1, IBC-ISL. 
295 A fixer is a person who sets up, adjusts, and calibrates machines in a factory. 
296 “Real Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc.,” Indiana War History Commission Report, p. 2, Box 76, folder 
labeled “Economic Changes—Manufacturing, Real Silk Hosiery Mills,” IWHC-ISA. 
297 “Annual Report: Real Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc. and Subsidiary Companies for the Year Ended 
December 31, 1942,” Box 1, Folder 22, RSC-IHS. 
298 “Conference between Representative of Real Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc., and American Federation 
of Hosiery Workers,” January 5, 1943, p. 24, Box 9, Folder 12, RSC-IHS. 
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hire, and train new workers. Before the war, Real Silk’s employee turnover reports for 
January-September for the year 1940 demonstrated a turnover rate of less than 3 percent 
each month.299 By September 1943, the net turnover rate had increased to 20.31 
percent.300 Additionally, labor turnover reports collected by the ESD in 1943 and 1944 
revealed that Real Silk’s turnover rate never dropped below 8.4 percent during these 
years.301 Other businesses in Indianapolis experienced similarly high turnover rates, 
regardless of size. For example, in September 1943, the ESD’s Labor Market Report 
shows that Allison Division of GM (22,739 employees) experienced a 12.09 net turnover 
rate, while Indianapolis Drop Forging Co. (287 employees) experienced a 13.59 percent 
turnover. The average turnover for all companies that month was 15.70 percent.302
                                                          
299 Irwin P. Egan, “Quarterly Turnover Report,” April-June 1940, Box 28, Folder 2, RSC-IHS; 
Irwin P. Egan, “Quarterly Turnover Report,” July-September, n.d., Box 9, Folder 10, RSC-IHS; Irwin P. 
Egan, “Quarterly Turnover Report,” January-March, n.d., Box 9, Folder 10, RSC-IHS. 
 While 
labor turnover is a natural part of business, too much turnover can be detrimental. When 
an established employee is replaced by a new hire, the company experiences a 
300 Real Silk submitted monthly employment turnover information to the Indiana Employment 
Security Division to be included in their Labor Market Reports. Each report contained accession rates, 
separation rates, and net turnover rates for select Indianapolis businesses. Separations included employees 
quitting, layoffs, dismissals, and retirement. “Accession” refered to the number of new hires in a given 
month. Monthly net turnover rates are calculated by dividing the number of separations by the average 
number of employees the previous month. Ashok Khurana et al., Human Resource Management (New 
Delhi: V.K. Enterprises, 2009), 165-169; Wayne Cascio and John Boudreau, Investing in People: Financial 
Impact of Human Resource Initiatives, Second Edition (Upper Saddle River: Pearson Education, Inc., 
2011), 88; “Table E-2. Summary of Labor Turnover in Selected Industries and Establishments,” Labor 
Market Developments Report for Indianapolis, IN, Labor Market Area, December 1943, p. 21, Box 38, 
ISA. 
301 Real Silk’s turnover was often higher than the average for non-munitions industries. Non-
munitions industries included lumber products, textile mill and finished textile products, leather products, 
and food products, among others. See chart in Fairchild and Grossman, The Army and Industrial 
Manpower, 141. For Real Silk’s turnover rates in 1943 and 1944 see Labor Market Reports in Employment 
Security Division, Labor Market Developments Report for Indianapolis, IN, Labor Market Area, vol. 1941-
1943 and vol. 1944, Box 38 and 39, ISA. 
302 “Table E-2. Summary of Labor Turnover in Selected Industries and Establishments,” Labor 
Market Developments Report for Indianapolis, IN, Labor Market Area, December 1943, p. 21, Box 38, 
ISA. 
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productivity deficit, as the company loses the experience and skill of the old worker for a 
new worker who needs to be trained.303
One of the reasons businesses experienced higher turnover rates was the 
proliferation of job-hopping and “pirating.” The wartime labor market very much favored 
the individual worker. The competition for employees was so fierce that workers had 
considerable power to select the workplace that offered the highest wage and best 
working conditions. If the wages, hours, or type of work did not suit an employee, he or 
she had many more options available than in the previous decade. Thus, job-hopping 
burgeoned as workers continually sought greener pastures.
 
304
Before the United States entered the war, businesses anticipated the labor 
shortages that would ensue if the nation joined the conflict overseas. To ward off 
shortages in their own factories, companies began “pirating” workers from other 
 The WMC and USES did 
not have the means to effectively enforce regulations against these practices. 
                                                          
303 Khurana et al., Human Resource Management, 166-167. 
304 Increases in labor turnover were common during the war. A November 1943 study from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics demonstrated that “the quit-rate among war-plant employees had reached a level 
where the plants had to hire seventeen workers to obtain a net increase of three for every 100 employed.” 
George Flynn asserted that the “lure of higher wages” created labor shortages in some industries and 
increased both job changing and worker migration to areas of the U.S. that promised high-wage positions 
such as shipbuilding on the coasts. Adding to this, Seidman asserted that increased congestion, insufficient 
housing, poor transportation and community services, and poor working conditions in industrial areas with 
high concentrations of war production bred worker dissatisfaction, which also contributed to turnover as 
workers sought better conditions. He stated that an “abundance of job opportunities translated this 
dissatisfaction into a high rate of labor turnover.” 
According to Marc S. Miller, women in particular had increased employment mobility. Not only 
did more women enter the workforce who would not have normally done so, women already in the 
workforce had more options open to them with men away at war. Nationally, the textile industry 
experienced especially high turnover, as the rate of women textile workers who changed jobs rose to 89 of 
every 100 workers in 1943. Despite government attempts to regulate job movement, the voluntary 
manpower mobilization program lacked the resources and power to enforce regulations. An Indiana WMC 
report also stated of the Employment Stabilization Plan, “The main complaint of applicants was that we 
were trying to force them to go where they did not want to go. Some companies enjoyed higher wage scales 
and better working conditions than others, and the applicants would decide they wanted to work there, and 
all the sales talk in the world would not deter them.” Flynn, The Mess in Washington, 44, 60; Joel Seidman, 
American Labor from Defense to Reconversion (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953), 153; 
Marc S. Miller, The Irony of Victory: World War II and Lowell, Massachusetts (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1988), 63-67; U.S. War Manpower Commission, Indiana, “Employment Stabilization Plan 
for Indiana,” The War Manpower Commission in Indiana, 1943-1945, pp. 53-54, IPC-ISL. 
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companies by actively recruiting skilled workers who were already employed and 
offering them higher wages. These companies also hoarded more workers than were 
actually required to fill their shifts and inflated their requests for additional employees to 
the USES, putting further strain on the limited labor pool.305 Real Silk could be accused 
of hoarding to some degree. In one memo, the Vice President admitted that the company 
kept a small reserve force to cover absenteeism in the War Contracts Department.306
In April 1943, President Roosevelt issued an Executive Order that froze wages 
and prices to check inflation in the wartime economy, and in part, to help block pirating 
and hoarding. After the Executive Order went into effect, companies could not raise 
wages to compete with other firms and attract employees without first seeking approval 
from the USES. However, the order did not eliminate the normal discrepancies in pay 
grades between industries, so employees continued to be drawn from lower-paying 
industries to higher-paying ones.
  
307 For example, a job as a turret lathe operator paid 
more than a power sewing machine operator.308 Therefore, it was difficult for Real Silk to 
compete with a higher paying industry for employees. Also, under the voluntaristic 
methods of the WMC, the USES had little real power to control wages. Therefore, 
pirating and job-hopping continued.309
                                                          
305 Roosevelt’s wage freeze attempted to equalize wages for comparable jobs in companies and 
labor areas across the country. The freeze did nothing to change the traditional differences in pay grades 
between different types of industries and jobs. Flynn, The Mess in Washington, 119; see also 43-44. 
 
306  Joseph Givner to Major G.H. Tompkins, April 21, 1943, Box 30, Folder 7, RSC-IHS. 
307 Flynn, The Mess in Washington, 43-44.  
308 The base rate per hour for a power sewing machine operator was 50 cents per hour, while a 
turret lathe operator earned $.90 to $1.05 per hour. For power sewing machine operator wages, see 
“Conference between Representative of Real Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc., and American Federation of Hosiery 
Workers,” February 4, 1943, p. 18, Box 9, Folder 12, RSC-IHS. For turret lathe operator wages, see United 
States Employment Service, “Table V. Wage Rates,” Local Labor Market Survey for the Indianapolis Area, 
January 31, 1942, p. 18, ISA. 
309 Flynn, The Mess in Washington, 43-44.   
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The local USES office took other measures as well to reduce the amount of job-
hopping. Indiana’s Employment Stabilization Plan included a measure that restricted the 
movement of employees in the labor market. A new employee who had already been 
employed in a position essential to the war effort for a 60-day period could only switch 
jobs if the USES referred them or the former employer provided a “statement of 
availability.” An employer was required to issue a statement of availability to a worker if 
he or she was fired or laid off for a period lasting more than seven days, if the employee 
could not continue employment without “undue personal hardship,” or if the employer’s 
wage scale or working conditions did not meet federal standards as required under the 
Walsh-Healy Act.310 The USES could also issue a statement of availability if the 
employer failed to do so, or could provide a referral if an employee was found to be 
under-utilized.311 However, the employee’s new job had to be of equal or greater 
essentiality to the war effort. The provisions of the Employment Stabilization Plan 
prohibited an employer from hiring anyone who could not present proof of availability.312 
Despite these precautions against job-hopping, many employers turned a blind eye and 
hired much-needed workers who had left their former employers without 
authorization.313
Real Silk encountered some problems with job hopping. In one 1943 company 
study of voluntary separations, 10.23 percent of employees who left the company did so 
 
                                                          
310 The Walsh-Healy Act “established minimum wages, maximum hours, and certain other 
conditions of employment for work performed on government contract” and “stipulated that government 
contracts must contain clauses binding the contractor to comply with the law.” Fairchild and Grossman, 
The Army and Industrial Manpower, 35. For provisions of the “statement of availability” see Employment 
Security Division, “Employment Stabilization Plan for Indiana,” in Indiana at War: a preliminary study 
prepared for the first meeting of the Indiana Historical Commission, 35, IPC-ISL. 
311 U.S. War Manpower Commission, Indiana, “Employment Stabilization Plan for Indiana,” The 
War Manpower Commission in Indiana, 1943-1945, 35-36, IPC-ISL. 
312 Ibid., 34-5. 
313 Flynn, The Mess in Washington, 65. See also Miller, The Irony of Victory, 65-66. 
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to pursue “other employment,” which was the fifth most common reason for voluntary 
separations.314 For example, employee Violet Mason left the factory to work at the 
Schwitzer-Cummins Company. When company management discovered that she had left 
work without authorization, they requested that she be fired from her new position and 
encouraged to return to Real Silk.315
Another root cause of labor turnover at Real Silk was layoffs. Although the 
company records do not include any studies of involuntary separations (i.e., dismissals 
and layoffs) the company management identified unanticipated layoffs as a hindrance to 
maintaining Real Silk’s workforce.
 Though it is unclear if she in fact returned to the 
mill, Real Silk and the WMC could only “request” that she return. 
316
                                                          
314 Joseph Givner to Frank H. Sparks, March 22, 1943, Box 30, Folder 7, RSC-IHS. 
 At the factory, layoffs were often spurred by 
contract delays, gaps between contracts, or cancellations initiated by government and 
military contractors. As illustrated in Chapter 3, these contractors controlled the supply of 
raw materials to war production factories. When shortages occurred or transportation 
errors delayed delivery of raw materials, factories had to stop production. Idle workers 
were often laid off, and many did not return to work when the contract resumed. As 
previously stated, Real Silk was required to issue a certificate of availability to workers 
laid off for more than seven days, at which time they were free to seek employment 
elsewhere. For example, on one contract, the company had to lay off 60 workers because 
of a gap between contracts. Workers sat idle and the company could not guarantee work 
315 Robert F. Wilson to Louis H. Schwitzer, “Re: Violet Mason,” May 25, 1943, Box 29, Folder 8, 
RSC-IHS; For the WMC’s policy on worker transfers see Ralph Bamberger to J. Givner, “RE: War 
Manpower Commission,” March 5, 1943, Box 29, Folder 8, RSC-IHS. 
316 Stoppages and gaps between government contracts resulted in lost workers on a Two-Man 
Mountain Tent contract at the Dalton, Georgia plant, a contract for M-40 parachutes with the McInerney 
Spring and Wire Co., and another unspecified contract. James F. Downey, “Industrial Engineering Dept. 
Summary of Claims for Shutdown at Dalton Plant on Two Man Mountain Tent,” February 22, 1943, Box 
30, Folder 6, RSC-IHS; J.C. Troyer to G.A. Efroymson, December 19, 1942, p. 2, Box 29, Folder 1, RSC-
IHS; James F. Downey to J. Givner, April 15, 1943, Box 29, Folder 1, RSC-IHS. 
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for employees until management received approval to begin work on the next contract, 
the government delivered necessary materials, and the engineers laid out machinery for 
the new manufacturing process. As was common practice at the time, the company laid 
off 60 female African American workers.317 In one report on the company’s war 
contracts, two of the five contracts listed encountered work stoppages at the request of 
the government or primary contractor.318
Labor turnover also increased because of changes in the composition of the 
workforce during the war. As stated previously, Real Silk hired more workers with little 
or no previous experience working in a factory, especially women workers, in the face of 
labor shortages. The company’s number of women workers increased from just over half 
to approximately eighty percent.
 Each contract delay and change hampered Real 
Silk’s ability to maintain a trained labor force. 
319 Labor turnover was generally higher among women 
workers, especially new factory employees.320 For example, one WMC survey of 16,000 
factories revealed that “for every two women hired in October 1943, a third woman quit 
her job in a war plant.”321
                                                          
317 James F. Downey to J. Givner, April 15, 1943, pp. 1-2,Box 29, Folder 1, RSC-IHS; Karen 
Tucker Anderson, “Last Hired, First Fired: Black Women Workers During World War II,” Journal of 
American History 69, no.1 (June 1982): 95. 
 As their husbands and other male family members left for 
military service, women took on greater responsibility at home at the same time the 
nation called upon them to fill the labor shortage left by soldiers. The war disrupted the 
stability of family units in countless households, and many women workers faced the 
318 J.C. Troyer to G.E Burke, “Status of War Contracts,” September 25, 1942, Box 29, Folder 2, 
RSC-IHS. 
319 See footnote 283. 
320 According to Marc Miller, women quit their jobs twice as often as men did, largely because 
women did not face the threat of the draft if not employed in war production. Miller, The Irony of Victory, 
64.  See also Flynn, The Mess in Washington, 44, 178-179, Richard L. Pifer, A City at War: Milwaukee 
Labor During World War II (Madison: Wisconsin Historical Society Press, 2003), 142, and Fairchild and 
Grossman, The Army and Industrial Manpower, 173. 
321 Pifer, A City at War, 142. 
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challenge of holding their families together, while also contributing to the war effort.322 
The number of female employees at Real Silk far exceeded all other businesses the ESD 
surveyed, and thus, more of the company’s workforce faced the challenge of juggling 
work and household responsibilities.323 The strain of balancing factory and home life is 
reflected in a 1943 report of voluntary separations from Real Silk. The company reported 
the top reasons that employees left their jobs. These included moving out of town 
(25.76%),324 long hours (15.14%), ill health (13.26%), and child care reasons 
(11.74%).325
Throughout the war, absenteeism was the leading cause of wartime production 
inefficiency and certainly one of the leading causes of inefficiency for Real Silk.
 Clearly focused on separations of women employees, the survey reveals that 
many Real Silk employees left the factory to preserve family stability or their own health. 
Women workers’ dual responsibilities in the factory and at home also resulted in 
increased absenteeism, which presented an even greater problem for American businesses 
than labor turnover. 
326
                                                          
322  For more on the dual roles of women during WWII see Cavnes, Hoosiery Community at War, 
228-245; Yellin, Our Mother’s War, 59-61; Pifer, A City at War, 138-148; Flynn, The Mess in Washington, 
177-178. 
 
According to a newspaper article written by Washington Post reporter Raymond Clapper, 
an absentee rate of two percent was acceptable, while a rate of 10 percent or higher was 
323 See footnote 284 above. 
324 This category included four subcategories including “a) to be married, b) husband has 
employment elsewhere, c) moved near husband in Army camp, d) returning home because of sickness in 
family or change in household set-up.” The “moving” category reveals that many women workers at Real 
Silk left work to preserve family stability. The survey does not specify whether or not the separations 
encompassed both men and women workers, so it is possible that some male employees left for reason “d.” 
Joseph Givner to Frank H. Sparks, March 22, 1943, p. 2, Box 30, Folder 7, RSC-IHS. 
325 Joseph Givner to Frank H. Sparks, March 22, 1943, pp. 2-3, Box 30, Folder 7, RSC-IHS. 
326 In WWII, the rise in absenteeism was a nationwide phenomenon. As with labor turnover, 
absenteeism was more common among women workers than their male counterparts. Flynn also points to 
new workers and older workers as those most commonly absent from work during the war. See Flynn, 
Mess in Washington, 44-46; Fairchild and Grossman, Army and Industrial Manpower, 173; Pifer, City At 
War, 142. 
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considered detrimental.327 Real Silk’s absentee rate exceeded the 10 percent mark most 
months and remained well above the average for Indianapolis businesses.328 The 
company’s War Contracts Department regularly had a higher rate of absent workers per 
shift than the company as a whole. For example, a report of absentees on February 24, 
1943, revealed that most of the war production shifts had an absentee rate of 20 percent 
or higher.329 Another 1943 memo even reported an astronomical absentee rate of 40 and 
50 percent for first and second shift cargo parachute employees.330
At the request of the WMC, Real Silk conducted a one-week survey in its War 
Contracts Department to help discover the root causes of the company’s high absentee 
rates. Management instructed factory timekeepers to remove the cards of any absent 
employees at the end of the day and turn them in to the Personnel Department. When an 
employee returned to work, he or she would report to the Personnel Department to 
retrieve the time card and be interviewed about the reason for the absence. Those citing 
illness as the reason were referred to the Medical Department before they were allowed to 
return to work.
 Both changes in the 
wartime workforce and in the average workweek contributed to the rise in absenteeism 
during WWII. 
331
                                                          
327 “Raymond Clapper (1892-1944),” The Eleanor Roosevelt Papers Project, 
 At the end of the week (April 10, 1943), Irwin P. Egan, director of 
personnel, reported that a total of 8,237 man hours were lost due to absenteeism. Of these 
http://www.gwu.edu/~erpapers/teachinger/glossary/clapper-raymond.cfm, (accessed 1 May 2013); 
Raymond Clapper, “Washington,” February 12, unknown year, newspaper clipping, Box 30, Folder 7, 
RSC-IHS. 
328 The Employment Security Division Labor Market Reports provide statistics for the average 
absentee rates only for 1943. These data show that the average absentee rate throughout 1943 remained 
between 4-7 percent for the major businesses surveyed in Indianapolis. Existing reports on the company’s 
absentee rates for the year indicate an 8-12 percent rate. See Labor Market Reports in Employment Security 
Division, Report of Labor Market Developments, Indianapolis, 1941-1946, 3 vols., Box 38-40, ISA. 
329 Four of six reported war production shifts had an absentee rate of 20 percent or higher on 
February 24, 1943. A.A. Zimmer to J. Givner, February 25, 1943, Box 30, Folder 7, RSC-IHS. 
330 Joseph Givner to J.F. Downey, April 1, 1943, Box 30, Folder 7, RSC-IHS. 
331 Irwin P. Egan to Joseph Givner, February 19, 1943, Box 30, Folder 7, RSC-IHS. 
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hours lost, 57 percent were attributed to illness, 13.03 percent provided no reason at all, 
and 12.1 percent were due to illness in the family. Other reasons provided included death 
in the family, personal business, visiting relatives, transportation issues, and childcare. 
During the week, approximately 25 percent of lost man hours due to absenteeism 
occurred on Monday, and the instances of absenteeism decreased each day for the rest of 
the week, with the lowest incidence occurring on Saturday. At Real Silk, employees 
worked only a half day on Saturdays, so absences on these days accounted for just under 
six percent of man hours lost.332
The official excuses provided for absences are somewhat misleading, and an 
extended nine-month study of absenteeism shed greater light on the problem.
 
333 Workers 
often used “illness” as a catch-all for any unexplained absences. As Clapper jokingly 
stated in his newspaper article on absenteeism, “The records may show illness given as 
the reason for a majority of absences, but who ever heard of a fellow coming back after 
taking Monday off and reporting that his absence was due to a hangover?”334
                                                          
332 For other reports of hours lost to absenteeism, see War Contract Absentee Reports in Box 30, 
Folder 7, RSC-IHS. Hours lost due to absenteeism reached as high as 15,118.25 or 21 percent for the week 
ending February 13, 1943. [illegible] Morris to Mr. Givner, “Report on Absentees for week ending Feb. 13, 
1943 in War Contract Department,” February 19, 1943, Box 29, Folder 4, RSC-IHS; Irwin P. Egan to Mr. 
Troyer, Mr. Downey, Mr. Givner, and Mr. Zimmer, April 21, 1943, Box 30, Folder 7, RSC-IHS. 
 Although it 
is unlikely that many of Real Silk’s employees skipped work to nurse a hangover, the 
root cause of absenteeism at the factory was most likely not illness. Margaret Bruce, R.N. 
of the company’s Medical Department recognized a more likely culprit. She reported, “A 
good percent of our absenteeism is due directly to the fact that the mother has no one to 
care for her child and it is an underlying cause of much of the absenteeism due to 
333 Joseph Givner to Donald M. Nelson, March 9, 1943, Box 30, Folder 7, RSC-IHS. 
334 Clapper, “Washington,” Box 30, Folder 7, RSC-IHS. 
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illness.”335
Those men and women, the latter chiefly, whose working hours are 
different than normal, have the worst problem. They have normal family 
problems concerning food, school, medical, house cleaning and—still 
being normal—want to shop and go to the movies. These, together with 
fatigue, are the main reasons for absenteeism—not sprees.
 Joseph Givner reached a similar conclusion at the end of the study. He wrote 
to the director of the WPB and the Indianapolis Area Office of the WMC: 
336
 
 
The “fatigue” to which Givner refers resulted, in part, from increased hours per 
work week. As production demands increased throughout the nation, many factories 
added shifts and extended work weeks.337 In Indianapolis, the Employment Stabilization 
Program, which went into effect on October 14, 1943, included a provision requiring war 
businesses to institute a 48-hour work week.338 Under pressure from the government to 
increase employee hours, Real Silk employees’ work weeks increased to as much as 
seventy hours a week during the war.339 However, before the increased work week was 
introduced in many war production areas, the WPB conducted a study of select factories 
that had increased their work week beyond the standard 40 hours. Some officials in the 
agency expressed doubt that an extension of work hours would increase production 
output.340
                                                          
335 Margaret Bruce, R.N., to Mr. Egan and Mr. Givner, February 12, 1943, Box 30, Folder 7, RSC-
IHS. 
 At a February 1942 meeting, one member of the War Production Board 
reported that the preliminary results of the study confirmed such fears. He stated, 
336 Joseph Givner to Donald M. Nelson, March 9, 1943, Box 30, Folder 7, RSC-IHS. 
337 On February 9, 1943, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order no. 9301, which in part, 
mandatorily extended minimum work week to 48-hours. As of October 1940, Real Silk’s factory operated 
on a standard 40-hour work week. Flynn, The Mess in Washington, 223-224; [J.L. Mueller] to Abner 
Raeburn, October 24, 1940, Box 22, Folder 15, RSC-IHS. 
338 U.S. War Manpower Commission, Indiana, “Employment Stabilization Plan for Indiana,” The 
War Manpower Commission in Indiana, 1943-1945 (May 1946), p. 38, IPC-ISL. 
339 Prior to the war (1939-1940), Real Silk had a standard 40 hour work week.  [J.L. Mueller] to 
Abner Raeburn, October 24, 1940, Box 22, Folder 15, RSC-IHS; G.C. Goljenboom to G.A. Efroymson, 
August 1, 1940, Box 28, Folder 2, RSC-IHS.  For Real Silk’s increased wartime hours, see “Conference 
between Representative of Real Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc., and American Federation of Hosiery Workers,” 
January 7, 1943, p. 36, Box 29, Folder 13, RSC-IHS. 
340 Meeting 61: November 5, 1942, “Manpower,” WPBPC, 99. 
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“Preliminary investigation shows that in the United States absenteeism begins to go up 
when the work week is lengthened to 48 and appears to increase progressively as hours 
are lengthened beyond that. The seven-day week, whether 56 or 70 hours appears 
invariably to result in a big increase in absences.”341
Nobody here expects less than 2 per cent of absenteeism in a plant, and 
perhaps more must be expected if hours are made longer under the new 
presidential order and the other drains on the civilian work force. When 
men and women are pushed more than 48 hours a week, they begin to feel 
the pressure for a frequent break and are apt to take a few days off every 
little while.
 Clapper agreed in his article on 
absenteeism, writing: 
342
 
 
As more mothers entered the workforce, childcare also became an increasingly 
significant problem for many women workers in Indiana.343 With husbands away at war, 
many mothers faced the pressures of single parenthood for the first time, having to take 
care of their families while also shouldering a new responsibility as main breadwinner.344 
Some factories across the nation set up in-plant daycare to ease the burden on female 
employees.345 However, company records indicate that opening a day nursery at Real 
Silk was not feasible because mothers could not bring their children to the factory.346
                                                          
341 Meeting VI: February 24, 1942, “Labor Problems in Shipyards,” WPB Minutes, 19. 
 
342 Clapper, “Washington,” Box 30, Folder 7, RSC-IHS. 
343 Cavnes, Hoosier Community at War, 228-229, 231-232, 233, fn 14. 
344 According to a U.S. Women’s Bureau survey conducted in 1944 and 1945, “Eighty percent of 
the thirteen thousand women polled were living at home with their families, and 90 percent made weekly 
contributions to the household budget. Of the remaining women workers, one in six still provided some of 
her wages to support dependents.” Andrew E. Kersten, Labor’s Home Front: The American Federation of 
Labor During World War II (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 103. See also Cavnes, Hoosier 
Community at War, 229. 
345 Most notably, the Kaiser shipyards in California and Oregon set up twenty-four-hour on-site 
child care centers. Other companies that set up or subsidized day care for children of employees included 
Grumman, Curtiss-Wright, Hudson, and Douglas. Yellin, Our Mothers’ War, 61. 
346 Joseph Givner to Frank H. Sparks, March 22, 1943, p. 1, Box 30, Folder 7, RSC-IHS. 
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With the already-congested transportation system, workers had a hard enough time 
finding their own transportation to work, let alone bringing their children along.347
Yet as the company nurse pointed out, many female workers in the mill were 
responsible for pre-school or school-age children. The nearest day nursery at Lockerbie 
Street provided some factory workers with day care services, but only those who worked 
the first, day shift. Ironically, the nursery was only open from 6:30 a.m. to 6 p.m., while 
the factory day shift let out at 6 p.m. exactly. Also, increases in working mothers at the 
factory during the war overburdened this particular day care center.
 
348
Inflexibility on the part of local stores, service providers, and even government 
agencies contributed greatly to increases in absenteeism. Many organizations failed to 
adequately accommodate the busy schedules of war workers, forcing employees to miss 
work to take care of everyday necessities.
 
349
                                                          
347 To help relieve labor shortages in industry-heavy areas such as Indianapolis, workers were 
recruited from surrounding areas to fill war-related jobs. The influx of new workers to cities strained both 
local housing and local transportation. Those workers who could not find local housing had to commute to 
work, placing greater strain on public transportation at the same time that the military required a reduction 
in public transportation use to accommodate increased military transportation needs. Real Silk and many 
other factories created transportation committees that attempted to set up car pools and other measures to 
relieve transportation congestion. See Ayer, “Hoosier Labor in the Second World War,” 104-105. Real 
Silk’s transportation committee appears in several company newsletters including, “Share the Ride,” The 
Real News 2, no. 1 (January 1, 1944): 1, ISL.  
 In a letter to the WPB director, Joseph 
Givner recommended a rearrangement of community services to meet the needs of 
workers and help reduce absenteeism. His suggestions included changing or extending 
the hours of grocery, drug, and department stores, doctor’s offices, and recreational 
activities such as the movies. The extended hours would ensure that essential services 
348 Bruce to Egan and Givner, February 12, 1943, Box 30, Folder 7, RSC-IHS. 
349 The level at which local service providers and store owners accommodated war workers varied 
by community. Indianapolis was not the only community that experienced a frustrating lack of 
accommodation in essential services for workers. This was especially problematic for women workers. For 
example, in Milwaukee, Pifer asserted that while a few stores and factories made adjustments to 
accommodate workers’ needs, these institutions represented the exception rather than the norm. Pifer, City 
at War, 143. See also Yellin, Our Mothers’ War, 61. 
103 
could be accessed by workers on all shifts. Local ration boards provided limited hours in 
which individuals could retrieve their ration books, coupons, and ration items. Givner 
recommended that the Indianapolis ration board provide special hours for employees who 
worked shifts in the middle of the board’s open hours.350
Frustrated with the lack of adequate “community-labor relationships” to 
accommodate workers, Real Silk’s management took many steps of their own toward 
reducing absenteeism in the factory. Such measures included reducing work hours on 
Saturdays to give workers time to shop, changing shift times to fit the local transportation 
schedule, incorporating two ten-minute breaks per shift to help reduce fatigue, increasing 
in-factory medical services for workers, providing a 24-hour cafeteria for meals, and 
providing a 5 percent bonus for night shifts.
 It is unclear whether or not any 
of his suggestions were implemented. 
351
The final major labor obstacle Real Silk faced was the renegotiation of union 
contracts to encompass the new War Contracts Department. During the Great Depression, 
labor organizations lost many of the gains made in the 1920s. The war placed unions in a 
position of greater bargaining power because workers were in high demand and could not 
 Givner pointed out the disconnect between 
workers’ changing needs and the willingness of community organizations and businesses 
to accommodate them. However, the factory did what it could to accommodate the needs 
of its workers. 
                                                          
350 Joseph Givner to Donald M. Nelson, March 9, 1943, Box 30, Folder 7, RSC-IHS; Joseph 
Givner to the Indianapolis Area Office of the War Manpower Commission, March 16, 1943, Box 30, 
Folder 7, RSC-IHS. 
351 Many factories in Indiana took similar measures to accommodate worker needs including 
bonuses, onsite banking, and in-plant daycare. For example, see Indianapolis Area Office, War Manpower 
Commission, “Case Studies in the Prevention of Absenteeism,” March 3, 1943, Case nos. 2, 4, and 5, Box 
30, Folder 7, RSC-IHS.  For Real Silk’s measures to aid employees see Joseph Givner to Frank H. Sparks, 
pp. 1-2, March 22, 1943, Box 30, Folder 7, RSC-IHS. 
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be fired as readily for union activities.352 Cooperation of organized labor was crucial to 
the success of the industrial mobilization program; and for the most part, unions 
cooperated with the government and the military to support wartime objectives. For 
example, shortly after U.S. entry into the war, labor and management joined in 
nationwide no-strike and no-lockout pledges that were instrumental in preventing work 
stoppages due to strikes.353
However, as U.S. involvement in the war loomed, unions feared that labor issues 
would take a back seat to the demands of war, and that the government and businesses 
would infringe on the rights of workers in the pursuit of total mobilization.
 
354
The war abroad…makes it all the more imperative American workers 
guard their recently-won gains against those who would utilize the war 
issue to deprive them both of their organization rights and their wage 
standards.
 The 
American Federation of Hosiery Workers anticipated this exact problem. In an October 
1939 issue of the Indianapolis Hosiery News, Sidney Hillman, head of the Amalgamated 
Clothing Workers and chairman of the executive council of the Textile Workers Union, 
wrote: 
355
 
 
Throughout the war, unions continued to bargain for worker rights with individual 
companies and through the National War Labor Board (NWLB), which was responsible 
for mediating “labor disputes and voluntary wage and salary adjustment cases.”356
                                                          
352 Ayer, “Hoosier Labor in the Second World War,” 107-8. 
 
353 Atleson, Labor and the Wartime State, 44-45; Ayer, “Hoosier Labor in the Second World 
War,” 110-111. 
354 Flynn, The Mess in Washington, 107-109; Atleson, Labor and the Wartime State, 141. For 
more on union concerns in WWII see Atleson’s entire work. 
355 American Federation of Hosiery Workers, “Hosiery Workers Warned of War ‘Scare’ Dangers,” 
Indianapolis Hosiery News 2, no. 9 (October 1, 1939): 3, Box 18, Folder 16, RSC-IHS. 
356 Ayer, “Hoosier Labor in the Second World War,” 110-111. 
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According to an Employment Security Division report on Real Silk, two labor 
organizations represented workers in the factory: the American Federation of Hosiery 
Workers (CIO) and the International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union (AFL).357 After 
the company created its war contracts department, the American Federation of Hosiery 
Workers (AFHW) sought to renegotiate aspects of its contract to encompass most 
employees in the new department. The National Labor Relations Board recognized the 
War Contracts Department as a bargaining unit on November 14, 1942, allowing the 
AFHW to submit a new contract that included employees in this department.358 Initially, 
Real Silk rejected the contract submitted by the union, insisting that key protections be 
removed such as clauses for maintenance of membership, checkoff, closed shop, and 
increased wage rates.359 So, over the course of several days in January and February 
1943, Real Silk met with representatives of the American Federation of Hosiery Workers, 
a union affiliated with the larger Textile Workers Union of America, to renegotiate the 
contract. At the conference, the union was represented by Alex McKeown, president of 
the AFHW, and D.L. Edison, president of local branch 35. Frank Dailey, Real Silk’s 
attorney, represented the company, and President G.A. Efroymson and Vice President 
Joseph Givner also attended. Company and union representatives discussed two major 
points in the meetings: increasing base wages and establishing a closed shop in the War 
Contracts Department.360
                                                          
357 “Real Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc.,” Report of the Indianapolis Area Director War Manpower 
Commission, Labor Market Analysis, vol. 1941-1943, Appendix, p. x-6, Box 38, ISA. 
 
358  United States of America Before the National Labor Relations Board, “In the Matter of Real 
Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc. and American Federation of Hosiery Workers, Branch 35, C.I.O.,” Case No. R-
4416, November 14, 1942, Box 9, Folder 11, RSC-IHS. 
359 “RE: Union Negotiations,” December 30, 1942, Box 30, Folder 2, RSC-IHS. 
360 See “Conference between Real Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc., and the American Federation of 
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On the first negotiating point, wages, the union requested that the company 
increase trainees’ base wages to 50 cents per hour and regular employees’ base wages to 
60 cents per hour.361 The minimum wage established by the NWLB for the type of 
workers in Real Silk’s war contracts department was 40 cents per hour for trainees and 50 
cents per hour for regular employees. Yet the company voluntarily paid five cents more 
per hour than the minimum wage required.362 However, as the union representatives 
pointed out, Real Silk was unlikely to draw in workers by paying only five cents above 
the minimum wage. McKeown also argued that a wage of ten cents above the minimum 
would improve employee morale and increase production efficiency enough to cover the 
increased wage and possibly more.363
While this might have been the case, two major obstacles discouraged Real Silk 
from considering a general wage increase: a nationwide freeze on wages and company 
losses on war contracts. On October 3, 1943, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 
9250, establishing the Office of Economic Stabilization and effectively freezing wages 
and salaries. No employer could increase wages without first receiving approval from the 
NWLB.
 
364
                                                                                                                                                                             
Folder 12, RSC-IHS; “Conference between Real Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc., and American Federation of 
Hosiery Workers,” February 8, 1943, Box 9, Folder 12, RSC-IHS. 
 Finding the freeze too inflexible, the NWLB eventually adopted the “Little 
Steel Formula,” which acted to stabilize wages rather than freeze them. This formula 
proposed that wage increases should correspond with rises in the cost of living, and that 
361 “Conference between Representative of Real Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc., and American Federation 
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362 “Conference between Real Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc., and the American Federation of Hosiery 
Workers,” January 5, 1943, p. 19, Box 9, Folder 12, RSC-IHS. 
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Folder 12, RSC-IHS. 
364 “Executive Order 9250 Establishing the Office of Economic Stabilization,” October 3, 1942, 
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adjustments of wages should not exceed 15 percent of the wage rate that existed in 
January 1941.365
In The Financial Role of Indiana in World War II, Bernard Friedman points out 
that in the face of such wage controls “smaller firms often felt at a disadvantage in 
competing for labor, and made known their dissatisfaction by appealing to the War Labor 
Board for permission to increase wage rates and, occasionally, even by evading federal 
wage-regulations.”
 
366 Some companies worked around the wage ceilings by offering 
fringe benefits and other incentives.367 However, Real Silk could not afford to offer wage 
increases, let alone extra benefits to war contract employees. The company was already 
losing substantial sums on war contracts.368
I would like to inject this as to higher rates: we have lost a tremendous 
amount of money on employees; our bids have been too low. They were 
not bids that were based high enough; as far as I am concerned, if you are 
going to put anything in here that means higher cost to us, we might just as 
well stop right here…[W]e cannot afford to continue to lose money. When 
you speak of a sixty-cent rate, that means higher cost.
 At the conference on February 4, Efroymson 
summarized the company’s position: 
369
 
 
Real Silk attorney Frank Dailey conceded that the company might consider 
increasing wages if contractors agreed to pay more for war products.370
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 However, price 
ceilings established by the Office of Price Administration limited the company’s 
366 Ibid., 152-153. 
367 Richard E. Schumann, “Compensation from World War II through the Great Society,” January 
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369 Ibid., 14. 
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opportunity to make higher profits.371 The military and government continually drove 
down contract prices on war products, and the company found it difficult to negotiate 
more money from contractors.372
Evidence in the conference transcripts suggests that the company and the AFHW 
union agreed to keep the base wage the same for existing bids and increase wages at the 
rate established by the NWLB for cost of living increases on future contracts.
 Due to fierce competition for war contracts, the 
company could not increase the price on its bids.  
373 The 
company attorney warned Efroymson that wage increases “will interfere with your 
procuring business because there will be a lot of people doing this work now and they are 
doing that with cheaper labor.”374 Yet the company president seemed to concede defeat 
when he stated, “The future is a matter of bargaining. You folks think we can get 
business at any price and [maybe] you are right. If we don’t get it, then we have no work 
for the people.”375
The AFHW’s proposal to establish a closed shop in the War Contracts 
Department had the potential to exacerbate the company’s problem with labor shortages. 
Union representatives proposed that union membership become a requirement of hiring 
in the department. Alex McKeown argued that labor organization within the War 
Contracts Department would help prevent work stoppages, sabotage, and “laying down 
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on the job” by holding workers more accountable.376
We have the Union and we have the closed shop with the lingerie workers. 
But there is all the difference in the world, I think, between the kind of 
employees you have always heretofore represented and these [war 
contracts] employees; you represent skilled, trained employees. These war 
workers aren’t skilled or trained employees. The kind of work they do 
never required the skill that is required in hosiery. Every one of those 
workers was trained by the company. Now we are urged constantly to get 
out more of the goods we have under contracts, and I don’t think, Mr. 
McKeown, that the Company should be asked to exclude from war work 
people that don’t want to belong to this or that organization. The Company 
has no objection at all to the employment of Union people but they believe 
in the lin[e] of work where they are pushed constantly for more production 
that they should not be required to hire a person unless he does belong to 
the Union. We have no objection if he joins.
 While the company did not actively 
oppose union activity among war workers, it was reluctant to accept any further barriers 
to employment in the face of Indianapolis’s critical labor shortages. Dailey outlined the 
company’s main arguments and concerns at the conference on January 5, 1943: 
377
 
 
While McKeown asserted that no worker passed up union membership willingly, 
the fact remained that some might not accept union membership as a stipulation for 
employment.378
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traditional labor issues rather than wartime problems.379 In the union contract signed on 
February 9, 1943, Real Silk allowed the AFHW to add union membership as a hiring 
requirement. Existing employees in the War Contracts Department could choose whether 
or not to join, but new employees were required to do so after 30 days of employment, 
placing yet another potential barrier to hiring in the shrinking labor market.380
Though it is difficult to draw any direct connection between wartime union 
demands and Real Silk’s labor and profit problems, the labor dispute further 
demonstrates the untenable position in which the company found itself during the war. In 
the midst of labor shortages and pressure from the military and government to produce 
materiél faster and cheaper, the company’s management had to balance the interests of 
war contractors, employees, and unions, with the company’s own need to make a profit. 
 
As is the case with company records of war contracts, Real Silk’s records 
pertaining to employment and labor issues during the war do not extend beyond 1943. 
                                                          
379 Flynn, The Mess in Washington, 180. 
380 In the face of wage freezes and strike bans, unions sought guarantees of security through 
negotiations for union shops or closed shops. Union representatives argued that they could focus on their 
responsibility to increase war production only if businesses guaranteed that their membership would remain 
stable or increase and that members would pay the dues necessary to financially sustain the union. 
According to Joel Seidman, the common counterargument management representatives presented against 
union and closed shops was that such arrangements violated a worker’s right to work by forcing him or her 
to join a union as a condition of employment. Union and closed shops also transferred more hiring power 
from management to union representatives. Although the number of union and closed shops increased 
during WWII, the War Labor Board’s standard compromise in labor disputes over open and closed shops 
was the inclusion of a “membership maintenance clause.” This clause required that union members who 
joined the union before or after the maintenance agreement maintain their membership in the union and 
continue to pay union dues for the duration of the agreement. At the conference, Real Silk ultimately 
agreed to include a membership maintenance clause. However, the AFHW’s closed shop proposal extended 
beyond the usual compromise offered by the War Labor Board. Although Real Silk’s representatives 
implied that a closed shop violated worker’s rights, the company’s argument against a closed shop focused 
more on the additional hiring barriers such an agreement would present. Joel Seidman, American Labor 
from defense to Reconversion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 92; Atleson, Labor and the 
Wartime State, 103-111; “Conference between Real Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc., and the American Federation 
of Hosiery Workers,” January 5, 1943, pp.12-15, Box 9, Folder 12, RSC-IHS; “Conference between Real 
Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc., and the American Federation of Hosiery Workers,” February 4, 1943, pp.30-33, 
74-76, Box 9, Folder 12, RSC-IHS. For final agreement on the closed shop issue at Real Silk, see 
“Memorandum read at foremen meeting,” February 9, 1943, Box 9, Folder 11, RSC-IHS. 
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However, the ESD’s employment statistics cover Real Silk’s employment record into 
1946, providing insight into the trends of growth and decline in the company’s workforce 
throughout the war. Employment increased during 1942 and early 1943, reaching a peak 
of 3,109 in March 1943. This seems to support the common perception that WWII pulled 
the U.S. economy from the Depression and expanded employment. Yet this expansion in 
Real Silk’s workforce did not last long. Employment declined steadily throughout the 
remainder of 1943, and the company ended the year with a little over 2,200 employees. 
Interestingly, this wartime workforce was smaller than the company’s workforce in 
certain years of the Depression Era. As stated in Chapter 1, Real Silk’s labor force in 
1930, 1934, and 1935 exceeded 3,000 employees.381 The contraction of the company’s 
labor force continued in 1944 and 1945 until it reached a low of 1,438 in November 
1945. While employment increased slightly in 1946 to a peak of 1,638, the workforce 
remained at approximately half the Depression Era workforce as the company headed 
into the post-war era. Labor shortages persisted throughout the war and ultimately had a 
negative effect on Real Silk’s labor force.382
                                                          
381 See Chapter 2, footnote 84. 
 Far from expanding Real Silk’s operations 
and productive capacity, the war reduced the company’s workforce by nearly half. 
382 See Employment Security Division, Report of Labor Market Developments, Indianapolis, 
1941-1946, Box 38-40, ISA. 
112 
Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
In his 2008 article on productivity growth in the U.S. economy during WWII, 
Alexander Field noted that “[c]onventional wisdom credits the war both with ‘bringing us 
out of the Depression’ and with ‘laying the foundations for postwar prosperity.’”383 
When examining the overall picture of industrial mobilization within the state of Indiana, 
this is what appears to have happened in most industries. According to George 
Blackburn’s study of Indiana’s industries during the war, “the most obvious change from 
1939 to 1947 was that Hoosier industry expanded tremendously.”384 For example, the 
number of production workers throughout the state increased 66.2 percent, while the 
value added by manufacturing increased by 208.8 percent overall in Indiana industries 
from 1939 to 1947.385
However, this “tremendous expansion” did not occur across the board. In a report 
from the Indiana Economic Council on the “Status and Trends in Indiana Manufacturers” 
from 1939-1947, “textile mill products” experienced the smallest amount of financial 
growth of all industry categories, with only a 77.5 percent increase in the value added to 
the industry throughout the war. More importantly, the textile industry had one of the 
only workforces in Indiana that shrank between 1939 and 1947.
  
386
                                                          
383 Field, “U.S. Productivity Growth,” 672.  
 Employment in the 
“textile mill product” industry dropped 31.8 percent, and in the closely-related industry of 
“apparel and related products,” the workforce decreased by 13.9 percent. The only other 
industry to lose employees was “leather and leather products,” with a 7.7 percent 
384 Blackburn, “Hoosier Arsenal,” 489. 
385 Blackburn, “Hoosier Arsenal,” 488-489. 
386 This trend was observed nationwide by the TWUA in 1943. Truman Committee Hearing, 
12876-12877. 
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decrease.387 In fact, Field demonstrated in his article that wartime economic expansion 
was almost exclusively limited to durable goods industries. Using industrial production 
data from the Federal Reserve Board, he illustrated that while durable goods production 
increased dramatically from 1941-1945, non-durable goods, such as textiles, leather 
goods, and paper products, experienced a comparatively small “spike.”388
As demonstrated in Chapters 1 and 3, Real Silk’s opportunities for industrial 
expansion throughout the war were limited by a plethora of obstacles. The factory’s 
conversion in 1942 set the company back both in terms of efficiency and financial 
stability, placing the mill on uneven footing at the start of its war production venture. 
Government regulations, shortages of materials, and transportation issues slowed 
production at every turn. Additionally, the company’s workforce shrank in the face of 
severe labor shortages. Combined with increased turnover rates, absenteeism, changes in 
the composition of the workforce, and the challenge of balancing union, company, and 
government requirements, war production became a maze of cumbersome obstacles that 
impeded effective production output.   
 
Seeing little opportunity for expansion and financial success within war 
production, Efroymson looked to civilian production and began planning for post-war 
expansion of the company’s civilian market as early as the end of 1943. In the 1943 
annual report, Efroymson indicated that the company intended to expand its 
manufacturing facilities for hosiery, lingerie, and other products after the war.389
                                                          
387 Blackburn, “Hoosier Arsenal,” 488. 
 Though 
the company continued to do a fair amount of civilian production in WWII, government 
388 Field, “U.S. Productivity Output,” 680-681. 
389 “Annual Report: Real Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc. and Subsidiary Companies for the Year Ended 
December 31, 1943,” Box 1, Folder 22, RSC-IHS. 
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regulations severely restricted the amount of civilian goods that could be produced. Little 
expansion of civilian production could be achieved in the wartime economy. However, 
Efroymson recognized that material shortages could continue to limit company expansion 
in the post-war economy, as well. In the 1944 annual report, he wrote: 
We are limited in the amount of hosiery, lingerie, dresses, etc., which we 
can manufacture, due to allocations and restrictions of materials needed 
for manufacturing purposes. We are giving careful consideration to our 
post-war operations and are planning to increase our production. This will 
depend upon our ability to get sufficient quantities of the needed materials 
for manufacturing and will also require the investment of considerable 
sums of money for needed manufacturing machinery and equipment.390
 
 
By the latter half of 1945, Real Silk had completed most of its war contracts, and 
the remainders were terminated by the government. While this ultimately left the 
company with a smaller volume of business for the year, Real Silk did manage to expand 
its civilian business in 1945. Yet, Efroymson again noted in the annual report that further 
expansion of the company’s civilian business depended on whether or not it would be 
able to obtain new machinery and required materials.391
In 1946, the company entered the post-war era with a reduced workforce, 
considerably smaller wartime profits than many industries, an entire war contracts 
department that needed to be reconverted, and the prospect of continued material 
shortages. The war left the company with few competitive advantages in the post-war 
hosiery market. To complicate matters further, the company’s president, Gustav 
Efroymson, passed away on November 3, 1946, in the middle of the nation’s difficult 
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transition from wartime to a peacetime economy.392
Throughout the remainder of the 1940s, Real Silk experienced a small amount of 
the “post-war prosperity” to which Field referred in his 2008 article. In 1946, Real Silk 
expanded its civilian business enough to cover the lost volume in war contracts, and the 
company’s net profits nearly doubled to $843,431.01. Profits continued to rise until 1948, 
when the company reached an all-time high net profit of $994,065.93. However, even 
this rapid expansion did not represent the company’s full productive potential. Machine 
and tool shortages persisted into 1947, and while the company had large requirements for 
new machinery and other “capital assets” to expand its production, access to these items 
continued to be restricted by scarcity and competition. Also, throughout this short period 
of seeming prosperity, Robert Efroymson anticipated an increase in competition as other 
wartime scarcities subsided; and in the 1947 annual report, Efroymson accurately 
predicted that “strenuous times lay ahead.”
 Efroymson’s son, Robert, took his 
father’s place as president of Real Silk and shouldered the responsibility of navigating the 
company through the crucial transition. It is difficult to determine if the company would 
have fared better in the post-war economy had Gustav Efroymson continued at the helm 
of the business; but under the direction of Robert Efroymson, it is clear that the company 
began to decline. 
393
As the company entered what many macroeconomic historians call the golden age 
of the U.S. economy (1948-1973), hosiery prices weakened and Real Silk experienced 
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reductions in its sales volume.394 By 1954, it is clear that Real Silk was on the way out. 
The annual report for 1954 indicated that the company was “contracting its 
manufacturing operations” and was renting out part of the Indianapolis plant. In 1955, 
Efroymson sold off the plant in Durant, Mississippi, as well as much of the machinery in 
the other plants. He observed that “[d]uring the past several years we were faced with the 
alternative of either operating our hosiery machines at less than capacity or selling part of 
our production at a loss. Now we can purchase hosiery made to our quality standards and 
in only such quantities as we expect to sell profitably.”395 The company no longer found 
it economically feasible to produce its own hosiery. The post-war “golden age” was not 
so bright for Real Silk, and it was during this time of supposed widespread economic 
prosperity that the company was finally forced to cease its manufacturing operations. In 
1957, Real Silk Inc. registered as an investment company with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. While the company continued to sell hosiery and other textile 
products through nationwide door-to-door sales, it ceased to manufacture any of its own 
textiles.396
                                                          
394 Field, “U.S. Productivity Growth, 672. 
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Real Silk was not alone in its post-war decline. The U.S. textile industry as a 
whole experienced rapid economic deterioration after the war, due in large part to the 
U.S. military’s post-war policies in Japan. After the Japanese surrendered in 1945, the 
United States military occupied Japan, and under the direction of the Supreme 
Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), sought to restore economic stability in war-
torn Japan by rebuilding some of the nation’s industries. The textile industry was one of 
the largest and most profitable in Japan before the war, and SCAP recognized textiles as 
an industry that would boost the nation’s economy without aiding future aggression. 
However, rebuilding the industry was not enough; trading relationships also had to be 
restored. Before the war, Japan mainly traded with China, Korea, Manchuria, and other 
nations in Southeast Asia. After the war, these countries, some of which suffered 
economic exploitation under Japanese occupation or colonization, were unwilling or 
unable to trade with Japan. Also, as the threat of communism grew in the post-war world, 
the United States was leery of reestablishing trade relationships between Japan and 
communist China. Instead, the U.S. government lowered trade barriers and opened the 
American market to Japanese textile goods. American manufacturers struggled to 
compete with these low-priced goods and many shut down or shipped their production 
overseas.397
In the “all-out” production effort for WWII, small, mid-size, and large companies 
in all industries were called upon to manufacture war materiél. Large companies like 
 While other U.S. industries benefitted from the loosening of government 
regulations after the war, the military’s policies in Japan further damaged the U.S. textile 
industry in the post-war era. 
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Ford, General Motors, and U.S. Steel have featured prominently in WWII literature, 
however few studies have been conducted on the role and experience of smaller 
businesses in the conflict. Small to midsize businesses with less financial and political 
clout faced greater obstacles in the mobilization program. Additionally, companies in 
lower priority industries did not experience the rapid economic or productive expansion 
that higher priority industries enjoyed. For Real Silk, the war neither pulled it from the 
depths of the Great Depression nor set it on the path to post-war prosperity. While the 
company appeared to be making a gradual economic recovery from the Depression in 
1941, forced conversion to war production counteracted many of these gains. For the 
many reasons discussed in this thesis, war production did not deliver the economic or 
employment boost promised, leaving Real Silk and many other companies in a tenuous 
position for the post-war market. Beneath the glimmer of Rosie the Riveter, patriotic war 
bond rallies, rolling production lines, and other poster children of the industrial 
mobilization effort lies the story of the thousands of businesses that struggled to stay 
afloat in the tumultuous wartime economy. They are as much a part of the WWII-era 
whirlwind of economic change as the large corporations in the war effort, and their story 
contributes to an understanding of the flaws in the industrial mobilization program of the 
Second World War. 
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